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ABSTRACT 
 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF PRICING AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES 
Antonio Moreno-Garcia 
Christian Terwiesch 
 
This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay, entitled “Pricing and 
Production Flexibility: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Industry,” uses a 
detailed dataset of the U.S. auto industry to examine the relationship between 
production flexibility and responsive pricing. Our analysis shows that deploying 
production flexibility is associated with a reduction in observed discounts and with an 
increase in plant utilization. Our results allow quantifying some of the benefits of 
production flexibility. The second essay, entitled “An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in 
Online Service Marketplaces,” uses a detailed dataset from a leading online intermediary 
for software development services to empirically examine the role of reputation on 
choices and prices in service marketplaces. We find that buyers trade off reputation and 
price and are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable bidders. Sellers 
primarily use a superior reputation to increase their probability of being selected, as 
opposed to increasing their prices. Our analysis shows that the numerical reputation 
score has a smaller effect in situations where there exists a previous relationship 
 viii 
 
between buyer and seller, when the seller has certified his or her skills, when the seller is 
local, or in situations that prompt higher interpersonal trust. The third essay, entitled 
“The Effects of Product Line Breadth: Evidence from the Automotive Industry,” studies the 
effects of product line breadth on market shares and costs, using data from the U.S. 
automotive industry. Our results show a positive association between product line 
breadth and market share and production costs. Beyond the effects on production costs, 
we study the effect of product line breadth on mismatch costs, which arise from demand 
uncertainty, and we find that product line breadth has a substantial impact on average 
discounts and inventories. Our results also show that platform strategies can reduce 
production costs and that a broader product line can provide a hedge against changes in 
demand conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation contains three independent essays that contribute to the 
empirical literature in operations and information management.  
The first essay, entitled “Pricing and Production Flexibility: An Empirical Analysis of 
the U.S. Automotive Industry,” examines the benefits of production flexibility in the 
automotive industry. Although the costs of deploying production flexibility are typically 
known to the firms, the benefits of flexibility are often more elusive. The main objective 
of this essay is to understand the interplay between pricing and production flexibility 
and to quantify the benefits of production flexibility. While there is a vast theoretical 
literature on production flexibility with endogenous pricing (e.g., Van Mieghem and 
Dada, 1999; Chod and Rudi, 2005; Goyal and Netessine, 2007), no previous work has 
empirically studied how flexibility affects prices. This essay combines several 
proprietary datasets of the U.S. automotive industry that provide production, sales and 
pricing information between 2002 and 2009. During this period, multiple vehicle models 
experienced changes in the flexibility with which they were manufactured (from 
inflexible to flexible or vice versa). This gives an identification strategy to examine the 
effect of flexibility. The analysis shows that deploying production flexibility is associated 
with reductions in observed discounts, as a result of an increased ability to match supply 
and demand. Under the market conditions observed between 2002 and 2009, flexibility 
accounts for average savings in discounts of $200 to $700 per vehicle. The deployment of 
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flexibility has effects on plant utilization, too. Jordan and Graves (1995) suggest a 
positive association between flexibility and capacity utilization when prices are 
exogenous. The ability to use responsive pricing does not alter this positive association, 
and the results empirically support the claim that the deployment of flexibility is 
associated with an increase in plant utilization (4% higher in the analyzed period).  
The second essay, entitled “An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in Online Service 
Marketplaces,” is concerned with a recent phenomenon of increasing economic 
importance. Technology has reduced the transaction costs associated with outsourcing 
tasks, and markets that match service buyers (firms or individuals who post work they 
would like to procure) and service sellers (firms or individuals who bid for the jobs 
posted by buyers) have proliferated. These markets have the potential to significantly 
affect the way service procurement is conducted, but they present novel challenges 
because buyers have little information about bidders and little control over their work, 
which leads to increased adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and to a higher 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the collaboration. In this context, reputation 
systems are likely to play an important role in the service procurement process, but their 
impact in this setting has not been studied in the literature – unlike with product 
markets like eBay, where there has been extensive research (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 
2004). This essay uses a detailed dataset from a leading online intermediary for software 
development services to empirically study reputation in online service marketplaces and 
its effect on prices and market outcomes. The analysis shows that buyers trade off seller 
reputation and price and are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable 
bidders. Sellers increase their bids with their reputation score, but primarily use a 
superior reputation to increase their probability of being selected as opposed to 
increasing their price. The essay also studies how various variables moderate the 
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importance of the reputation score. The reputation score has a smaller effect in situations 
where there exists a previous relationship between buyer and seller, when the seller has 
certified his or her skills, when the seller is local, or in situations that prompt higher 
interpersonal trust.  
The third essay, entitled “The Effects of Product Line Breadth: Evidence from the 
Automotive Industry,” studies the effects of product line breadth in the U.S. automotive 
industry during the period 2002-2009. Theoretical models (e.g., Lancaster 1990) suggest 
that broader product lines should result in higher firm market shares and in higher 
production costs. However, as noted by Netessine and Taylor (2007), “empirical 
researchers have analyzed linkages between variety and production costs, but have 
arrived at contradicting conclusions.” This essay provides new evidence from the U.S. 
automotive industry, showing the effects of a broader product line on market shares and 
costs. The results suggest that one additional product in the line is associated with an 
increase of 0.1% in the market share of an automaker and with an increase of around 
$175 on the average production costs. In addition to providing evidence from a new 
industry to the literature on product line breadth, this essays attempts to bridge the gap 
between some theoretical notions that have been developed in the operations 
management and product development communities and the existing empirical 
literature on the effects of product line breadth. For example, Fisher (1997) discusses two 
types of costs in supply chains: physical costs are the costs of production, transportation 
and inventory storage, while market mediation costs arise “when supply exceeds demand 
and a product has to be marked down and sold at a loss or when supply falls short of 
demand, resulting in lost sales opportunities and dissatisfied customers.” The literature 
on product line breadth has focused on the first type of costs, but has not considered the 
second type, which are a consequence of demand uncertainty and can be generically 
 4 
 
referred to as mismatch costs. In the automotive industry, mismatch costs can be 
observed in the form of discounts and inventories. The effects of product line breadth on 
mismatch costs are found to be substantial, with an additional product in the line being 
associated with an increase of around $100 in average discounts and with carrying three 
additional days of supply in the average inventory of the models offered by the firm. On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that product platforms (Robertson and Ulrich 
1998) allow offering a broad product line while controlling production and development 
costs. Consistent with this view, data from the U.S. automotive industry shows that 
using platform families decreases the production costs. Finally, the essay develops an 
attribute-based measure of product line breadth that captures the range of fuel economy 
levels offered by an automaker, and shows that automakers who offer a broader range 
of fuel economy levels increase their market share and reduce their average discounts as 
gas prices increase, suggesting that choosing the right type of product breadth can 
provide a hedge against changes in demand.  
While the three essays are independent and self-contained studies, each of them 
focusing on specific research questions, there are some common themes that are present 
in all of them, which broadly characterize the general contribution of this dissertation.  
One common theme is that these three essays study questions that can be 
broadly characterized as pertaining to operations strategy (Van Mieghem 2008). The first 
essay is concerned with the strategic decision of deploying manufacturing flexibility 
(Van Mieghem 2008, Chapter 5) and the upsides of this decision in terms of pricing 
power and increased resource utilization. The second essay is concerned with the 
strategic decision of sourcing (Van Mieghem 2008, Chapter 7). In the setting of the 
second essay, sourcing is done through an online marketplace, and the focus of the work 
is to understand how buyers weigh seller reputation in their procurement strategy. The 
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third essay is concerned with product line strategy and its effects on market shares and 
costs. The settings in which these questions are analyzed are complementary. Essays 1 
and 3 focus on a manufacturing setting (the automotive industry), while the second 
essay focuses on a service context (software development). 
 The second common theme that the three essays touch on is pricing. The first 
essay analyzes how the deployment of product mix flexibility affects pricing power. The 
second essay analyzes the tradeoffs made between price and reputation by buyers and 
sellers of services in an online marketplace. The third essay provides evidence on how 
product line breadth affects price discounts.  
A third common theme that is relevant to the three studies is the theme of 
flexibility. Flexibility is typically defined as the ability to adjust and respond to new 
information (Van Mieghem 2008), and it can take multiple forms. In the first essay, the 
main type of flexibility of concern is the ability to produce multiple products using the 
same resources. Firms can adjust to new conditions by adjusting their production mix 
and/or by using responsive pricing. The setting of the second essay could be 
characterized as one where workforce capacity is flexible. As opposed to maintaining a 
dedicated workforce, buyers can use online service marketplaces to tap into the global 
talent pool on an on-demand basis. On the other hand, there is flexibility on the seller 
side as well, since workers do not depend on a particular employer and can decide when 
to work. In the third essay, we consider a specific type of shock to which companies may 
want to adjust: changes in gas prices that change the relative demand for different 
products. Firms can respond to those changes by changing the production mix (as in 
Essay 1) or they can hedge against those changes by offering a broad product line (Essay 
3).  
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Finally, on the methodological side, a common feature that is shared by the three 
essays is that they are all empirical studies. The three studies use observational data that 
comes from proprietary sources. For the first and the third essays, we have collaborated 
with TrueCar.com, a market research company specialized in new car pricing, and we 
have gained access to an extensive dataset on prices and incentives in the U.S. auto 
industry. We have combined this pricing data with other more widely available data 
about the U.S. automotive industry, including sales, production and plant data that 
comes from Ward’s Automotive and Automotive News. For the second essay, we have 
partnered with vWorker (formerly rentacoder.com), one of the leading intermediaries 
for software development projects, who has given us access to the entire history of 
transactions conducted on the site, including more than 1,800,000 bids corresponding to 
more than 250,000 projects that were posted in between May 2001 and November 2010. 
Actually, one by-product of this dissertation is the compilation of these two novel 
datasets in the space of automotive pricing and online service marketplaces. These 
datasets can be used to study multiple questions in operations management and other 
related fields, beyond the essays included in this dissertation.  
References 
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Lit. 42(2) 457–486. 
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Research 53(3) 532–548.  
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Review, 75: 105-117. 
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Chapter 2 
Pricing and Production Flexibility1 
Abstract 
 
Despite the abundant theoretical literature on production flexibility, price 
postponement and dynamic pricing, there exists limited empirical evidence on how 
production flexibility affects pricing decisions. Using a detailed dataset of the U.S. auto 
industry, we examine the relationship between production flexibility and responsive 
pricing. Our analysis shows that deploying production flexibility is associated with 
reductions in observed discounts, as a result of an increased ability to match supply and 
demand. We estimate that, under the observed market conditions between 2002 and 
2009, flexibility accounts for average savings in discounts of $200 to $700 per vehicle. 
This is equivalent to savings of about 10% of the total discounts provided in the 
industry. We also demonstrate that list prices and plant utilization increase after the 
deployment of flexibility, providing additional sources of benefit from flexibility 
adoption. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first piece of empirical 
evidence on how the deployment of production flexibility affects firms’ pricing 
behavior.    
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on Moreno, A., C. Terwiesch. 2011. Pricing and Production 
Flexibility. An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Industry. Working Paper.  
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2.1. Introduction 
Flexibility is typically defined as the ability to adjust and respond to new 
information (Van Mieghem 2008). Flexibility can take multiple forms. Flexibility can 
exist with respect to a firm’s pricing decisions (pricing flexibility) as has been 
demonstrated in a large body of literature on dynamic pricing (including yield 
management and revenue management; see Bitran and Caldentey 2003 for an overview). 
Flexibility can also exist with respect to a firm’s production decisions (production 
flexibility). Typically, such changes in production take the form of different production 
quantities (volume flexibility, see Sethi and Sethi 1990) and different product mixes (mix 
flexibility, see Fine and Freund 1990).  
The objective of this paper is to understand the interplay between pricing flexibility 
and production flexibility. To motivate this choice of research objective, consider the 
automotive industry and its market dynamics in 2007. Over the first six months of 2007, 
fuel prices in the US increased by roughly 50% (from $2 per gallon to $3 per gallon), 
creating a significant (and exogenously triggered) shift in demand towards more fuel 
efficient vehicles. The responses to this market shift varied substantially across 
automotive manufacturers. To illustrate this variation, consider two comparable vehicles 
in the mid-size SUV segment, the Ford Edge and the Honda Pilot. Both vehicles have the 
same fuel economy (17 mpg in the city and 23 mpg on the highway). Figure 2.1 shows 
how Ford and Honda reacted to the shift in demand towards more fuel efficient 
vehicles, away from SUVs. Figure 2.1 (left) displays monthly production levels. 
Production volumes for the Ford Edge remained relatively constant, while production 
volumes for the Honda Pilot were reduced as gas prices increased. Figure 2.1 (right) 
displays the average incentives the two manufacturers provided. We will provide a 
careful definition of incentives at a latter point. For now, observe that the incentives 
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provided by Honda did not change with fuel prices, while incentives for the Ford Edge 
increased significantly over 2007. In other words, Ford relied on its ability to adjust 
prices (by providing incentives), while Honda relied on its ability to adjust production 
volume. 
One of the essential aspects of production flexibility in the auto industry is given by 
the number of vehicle types that can be manufactured in a production facility. This is 
what the operations literature typically calls mix flexibility. Prior literature (e.g. Jordan 
and Graves, 1995) has identified some of the benefits of mix flexibility and has 
recognized that partial flexibility in the allocation of products to plants can yield most of 
the benefits of full flexibility. Our definition of flexibility (developed in Section 4) 
captures this notion of partial mix flexibility and is based on the ability of a plant to 
manufacture multiple platforms. According to our definition of flexibility, in 2007, the 
Honda Pilot was produced in flexible plants. We therefore consider it a “flexible model” 
for that time period. In contrast, the Ford Edge was produced in plants that could only 
produce this one SUV platform. We thus define it as an “inflexible model” for that time 
period. The two models in our motivating example also differ in a number of other 
aspects beyond flexibility, and no conclusion about the effect of flexibility can be drawn 
from the example alone. The rest of this paper explores systematically how companies 
adjust to changes in demand. In particular, the paper studies the relationship between 
production flexibility and pricing suggested by the motivating example.  
The link between pricing and production flexibility has not been empirically studied 
in the existing literature. This might be partially explained by the difficulty of obtaining 
adequate data. In our empirical setting, the U.S. automotive industry, list prices 
(Manufacturer Suggested Retail Prices, from now on “MSRP”) for new vehicles are 
relatively easy to find. However, manufacturers constantly apply incentives that result 
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in discounts and transaction prices that are significantly below the MSRP. These 
incentives and thus the actual transaction prices are much harder to obtain. The absence 
of pricing data has limited prior research to studying sales volume as opposed to 
analyzing the underlying demand dynamics. These demand dynamics, including the 
demand volatility, however, are essential when analyzing the benefits associated with 
flexibility.  
We have collaborated with TrueCar.com, a market research company specialized in 
new car pricing, and we have gained access to a proprietary data set on prices and 
incentives in the U.S. auto industry. We have combined this pricing data with other data 
about the U.S. automotive industry, including sales, production and plant data. 
Combining these datasets, we are able to model consumer demand, changes in 
consumer demand, and manufacturer’s responses to these changes, be it in the form of 
price adjustment or in the form of production adjustment. This allows us to empirically 
analyze the relationship between flexibility and pricing. Our main identification strategy 
exploits the fact that in our sample there are models that change their flexibility level 
from flexible to inflexible and vice versa.  This unique dataset, together with our 
econometric approach, allows us to make the following three contributions: 
First, we show how production flexibility affects incentives. Short run price 
adjustments in the automotive industry occur mainly through discounts from the MSRP 
that are implemented using incentives from the manufacturer. We provide evidence that 
deploying flexibility allows manufacturers to reduce the use of incentives, typically by 
between $200 and $700 per vehicle. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical evidence supporting the theoretical literature on production flexibility with 
endogenous pricing (e.g. Van Mieghem and Dada, 1999; Chod and Rudi, 2005; Goyal 
and Netessine, 2007; Ceryan et al 2011).  
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Second, we analyze the effect of flexibility on plant utilization. Jordan and Graves 
(1995) suggest a positive association between flexibility and capacity utilization when 
prices are exogenous. The ability to use responsive pricing does not alter this positive 
association, and we empirically support the claim that the deployment of flexibility is 
associated with an increase in plant utilization. Our measure of flexibility is built on 
Jordan and Graves’s chaining model, emphasizing the benefits of partial mix flexibility. 
We show that partial mix flexibility increases plant utilization by about 4%. 
Third, we introduce a novel approach to measuring demand volatility. In presence of 
endogenous pricing, a measure of sales variance would be affected by the firm’s 
discounting behavior, and would therefore be an unsuitable measure of volatility. Our 
measure is based on a structural choice model that includes the actual transaction prices. 
This enables us to estimate counterfactuals (what would have been demand had there 
been no discounts?). Using this structural model of demand volatility, we develop a 
cross-sectional analysis in which we show how demand volatility affects discounts. We 
show that models with lower demand volatility give lower discounts, regardless of 
production flexibility. This suggests that firms that can design vehicles that are not 
exposed to substantial demand volatility can avoid price discounts even when they do 
not rely on flexible production. Our demand model identifies Mini, Porsche, Smart, and 
Lexus as makes that were able to have a consistent demand pattern in an industry that 
was otherwise plagued by volatility. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the underlying 
theory and related literature and also develops our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
our dataset. Section 4 describes our measures of production flexibility and demand 
volatility. Section 5 introduces the econometric specification and describes the 
identification strategy. In Section 6, we present our main results, followed by Section 7 
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which conducts several robustness checks and also explores alternative explanations.  
Finally, Section 8 concludes and points at some areas of current and future research.  
2.2. Theoretical Context and Hypotheses 
The literature on flexibility and the literature on dynamic pricing and revenue 
management provide the theoretical context for our work. Within the literature on 
flexibility, there exist a number of studies that have modeled the flexibility and 
production postponement decisions, to which our work is related. The earlier work in 
this research stream models the flexibility investment decision under uncertainty in 
product demand (Fine and Freund, 1990). Jordan and Graves (1995) introduced the 
concept of partial flexibility and demonstrate that partial flexibility can yield most of the 
benefits of full flexibility. Both of these studies, as well as many others not mentioned 
here, assume prices to be exogenous. In contrast, the literature on dynamic pricing and 
revenue management has largely focused on developing models that let firms adjust 
prices when capacity is exogenous. Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) is a seminal paper in 
this line of research; see Bitran and Caldentey (2003) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 
(2003) for comprehensive overviews. Some of the more recent literature on flexibility 
and postponement has endogenized the pricing decision in models where firms also 
choose capacity. For example, Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) study how the timing of 
decisions with respect to the demand uncertainty, in particular production and price 
postponement, affects the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value. Other 
recent papers that analyze flexibility in presence of responsive or dynamic pricing are 
Chod and Rudi 2005, Goyal and Netessine 2007, and Ceryan et al 2011. Despite these 
careful analytical studies of dynamic pricing and production flexibility, the empirical 
evidence in this area remains scarce, which is one motivation of the present study.  
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A topic in the manufacturing strategy literature that has been empirically studied 
more extensively is what one might call the opposite of mix flexibility, focus. Focus has 
been shown to improve operational performance in some settings (e.g. Huckman and 
Zinner 2008, Kc and Terwiesch 2011). Our empirical analysis shows evidence of some 
positive benefits of producing multiple product lines in one facility (and thereby be 
unfocused) and thus speaks to the flexibility vs. focus debate.  
The Marketing literature on promotions is also related to our work. This literature 
has mainly focused on quantifying the effect of promotion on sales (e.g. Gupta 1988) and 
other related issues (for a comprehensive review, see Neslin 2002). To our knowledge, 
no paper in this line of work has studied how decisions related to flexibility and 
utilization affect promotions and so we only mention this field for the sake of 
completeness. 
A number of empirical operations papers have studied various aspects of the 
automotive production process, including MacDuffie et al. 1996, Fisher and Ittner 1999, 
and Fisher et al. 1999. Closest to our work, Cachon and Olivares (2010), study the drivers 
of inventory in the U.S. downstream automotive supply chain. Our paper is concerned 
with understanding the drivers of observed pricing, rather than the drivers of 
inventories, but we share their interest in the role of flexibility. Also, Goyal et al (2006), 
empirically study the drivers of manufacturing flexibility in the automotive industry. 
Our paper does not look into what drives flexibility, but into the effects flexibility has on 
pricing.    
A key novelty of our paper is the fact that we consider the manufacturer’s pricing. 
Very few empirical papers in operations management have examined the role of prices. 
An exception is Gaur et al. 2005, which investigates the correlation of inventory turnover 
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and gross margin. Including prices also allows us to build a rich model of the demand 
dynamics, including an appropriate measure of demand volatility. 
In order to motivate our research hypotheses, consider again our example from the 
introduction. To keep the example simple, assume two types of vehicles, fuel efficient 
and fuel inefficient, and two types of plants, flexible (can produce both types of vehicle) 
and inflexible (can only produce one type of vehicles).  Following an increase in gas 
prices, demand for fuel inefficient vehicles decreases. The manufacturer can respond by 
offering more incentives (higher discounts from the MSRP) for fuel inefficient vehicles 
or by reducing the production volume of fuel inefficient vehicles. By definition, for a 
manufacturer with an inflexible plant, a reduction in production volume of the fuel 
inefficient vehicle implies a reduction in plant utilization. This leads to an increase in the 
average cost per vehicle in the plant, because the plant’s fixed costs are spread over a 
lower number of units. Higher average costs result, all else being equal, in lower average 
profits per car. If the manufacturer with the inflexible plant decides to maintain high 
production volume (and thus high plant utilization), incentives are needed to avoid 
vehicles accumulating in inventory. In this case, the revenue per vehicle sold decreases, 
which also results in lower average profits.  
A manufacturer with a flexible plant can shift production of the fuel efficient model 
to the plant that is presently producing the less attractive fuel inefficient vehicle. 
Depending on the level of correlation between demand for fuel efficient and fuel 
inefficient vehicles, overall demand for the manufacturer might go down or not go 
down. However, some pooling benefits exist even at modest levels of positive 
correlation and so the manufacturer with the flexible plant is less affected by the 
exogenous demand shock. Note that after adjusting the product mix, the manufacturer 
with the flexible plant might still decide to reduce plant utilization (at the expense of a 
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higher average cost) or to increase incentives (at the cost of foregoing revenue). The 
optimal decisions will be a result of manufacturers playing a complex game in which the 
equilibrium decisions with regards to production volumes and incentives provided will 
depend on their demand and cost curves and those of their competitors. Rather than 
estimating the parameters of those curves, we are interested in the equilibrium average 
relationship between flexibility and incentives under the demand patterns observed 
during our period of analysis. The exact magnitude of the effect of flexibility will 
depend on the shape of the cost and demand curves as demonstrated in the recent 
modeling work by Ceryan et al (2011). Since flexibility allows manufacturers with a 
flexible plant to adjust the mix, these manufacturers have an additional tool they can use 
before engaging in giving costly incentives. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis H1. The deployment of flexibility is associated with a reduction of the average 
incentives 
In addition to confirming that the direction of the effect is the one we hypothesize, 
we also seek to quantify the magnitude of the impact of flexibility on discounts for the 
US automotive market during the period covered by our data (2002-2009). 
Next, we turn our attention to the relationship between flexibility and plant 
utilization. Firms can offer incentives to encourage sales. These incentives are 
hypothesized to be higher for inflexible plants and thus the relationship between 
flexibility and utilization depends on the actual cost and demand curves. In absence of a 
complete equilibrium model, we follow the Jordan and Graves (1995) argument that 
flexibility allows firms to change the production mix and thus provides them with an 
alternative to reducing plant utilization:  
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Hypothesis H2. The deployment of flexibility is associated with an increase in plant 
utilization 
Again, rather than merely validating that the effect goes in the hypothesized 
direction, we are interested in providing an estimate of the magnitude of the effect of 
flexibility on plant utilization. 
Our primary hypothesis H1 refers to effects of flexibility on incentives, but flexibility 
is not the only way in which firms can avoid giving incentives. Some manufacturers 
seem to be able to design and market vehicles that are not subject to substantial demand 
volatility. Understanding the causal pathway of how these manufacturers are able to 
limit demand volatility is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we restrict our last 
hypothesis to the effect of demand volatility on incentives:  
Hypothesis H3. Firms give lower incentives for vehicles with low demand volatility  
2.3. Empirical Setting and Data 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the U.S. automotive industry, covering the section 
of the supply chain that spans from the manufacturers to the final consumers. There are 
three main reasons why we decided to choose the automotive industry as our empirical 
setting. First, the automotive industry is important on its own. The U.S. automotive 
industry is responsible for more than 3 million jobs in the U.S and contributes 5% of the 
total U.S. GDP (Ramey and Vine 2006). Second, it is an industry where operations and 
supply chain management play a major role, and companies are known to follow 
different operational strategies. Third, there is a limited amount of manufacturers in the 
market and their final product is comparable using a reduced number of attributes. The 
methodology that we use can be easily adapted to study the impact of flexibility on 
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prices in other industries and also to study the impact of other operational decisions 
besides the deployment of flexibility. 
In the auto industry, there exist a number of prices that govern the transactions 
between manufacturers, dealers and customers. The manufacturer sets the MSRP. 
Vehicles are typically allocated to dealers before they are produced. Manufacturers 
charge dealers the invoice price when the vehicle is released for transportation. The final 
transaction price is usually obtained after some haggling between the consumer and the 
salesperson. At predetermined times (typically quarterly), the manufacturer reimburses 
a percentage of the invoice price (or the MSRP, depending on the manufacturer), known 
as the holdback. This common practice explains how the dealers can profitably sell cars 
below the invoice price.  
In addition to discounts, a manufacturer can offer trade incentives at various times. 
Incentives include any costly action undertaken by the manufacturer to reduce the net 
cost of purchasing a vehicle, and they can be targeted to the dealer or to the final 
customer. These incentives sometimes take the form of loans in favorable conditions or 
other initiatives of financial nature.  
In this paper we focus on the manufacturer’s pricing decisions. To respond to 
changing market conditions, manufacturers offer varying levels of incentives to dealers 
and/or consumers. In 2009, auto companies reportedly spent more than $28 billion in 
incentives. Table 2.1 shows the average incentives offered by each manufacturer. This 
includes incentives given by the manufacturers to both dealers and final consumers, and 
includes the cost of financial incentives (e.g. 0% interest loans). However, it does not 
include the holdback, which is relatively stable over time and typically does not change 
with market conditions. 
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There exist systematic differences in the incentives that firms give. The Big Three are 
among the companies who offer the highest incentives, and Toyota and Honda are 
among the companies who offer the lowest incentives. Our analysis explains part of this 
observed variation through variables such as production flexibility and demand 
volatility. We will use firm (and model) level fixed effect to ensure that we truly identify 
the effect of flexibility as opposed to picking up firm level effects. 
Our data covers the vehicles marketed in the U.S. in the period of 2002-2009. We 
have information on the 348 distinct models (e.g. Chevrolet Malibu) marketed in the U.S. 
during the period. Our analysis uses monthly data and we have a total of 20,052 model-
month (e.g. Chevrolet Malibu, February 2003) observations. We combine three sources 
of data: volume data, pricing data and vehicle-level data.  
Volume data. The volume data is obtained from WARDS automotive and includes 
monthly sales and domestic production (if applicable). Domestic production refers to 
vehicles produced in the U.S., Mexico or Canada. If a car is imported from outside this 
region, we label it as not domestic. We have information about the platform on which 
each of the domestically produced models is based and the segment to which they 
belong. We observe how domestic production is distributed across different plants, and 
also across different facilities within the plant (e.g. Fremont 1 and Fremont 2). We have 
also obtained data on the annual capacity of U.S. plants, which allows us to calculate the 
plant utilization.  
Pricing data. We have obtained incentive data from TrueCar. TrueCar is a market 
information company that provides prospective car buyers with real transaction price 
data of new cars (www.truecar.com). TrueCar obtains data directly from car dealers, 
respected dealer management system (DMS) providers, and well-known data 
aggregators within the automotive space. We have collaborated with TrueCar and we 
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have obtained access to some of their historical data. In this paper we focus on the 
incentives given by manufacturers. As are sales and production data, incentive data is 
available at the model-month level and indicate the average amount spent by the 
manufacturer for each vehicle sold in that month. The measure includes incentives given 
to the dealers and to the final consumers, and it also includes incentives of financial 
nature (e.g. credit in favorable condition), which are converted to their equivalent 
monetary values. The incentive figure does not include holdbacks, since these are not 
used to respond to market conditions.  Not all the incentives are necessarily passed-
through to the consumer (see Busse et al 2006), yet incentives always represent an 
additional cost to the manufacturer.  
Vehicle level data. Our model of demand volatility uses data on vehicle attributes, 
which we also obtain from WARDS Automotive. The attributes we focus on are weight, 
horsepower, fuel economy, length, height, wheel base and MSRP. These attributes 
remain constant within the model year. Combining fuel economy with gas prices 
(obtained from the Energy Information Administration), we can generate a measure of 
miles per dollar, which varies monthly for every given model. The vehicle attributes are 
specific to the trim level (e.g. Chevrolet Malibu LS 4dr Sedan) and model year. This 
poses some integration challenges, because our sales, inventory and incentive data is 
available at the model level (e.g. Chevrolet Malibu), and we do not observe the 
breakdown of sales for the different trims of a model (or for different model years that 
might be sold simultaneously). Our solution is to match every model with the median of 
the attributes across the different trims in which a model is available. We also run some 
robustness checks using the minimum and the maximum of the attributes instead of the 
median. 
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2.4. Measures of Flexibility and Volatility 
Our objective is not to identify the specific contribution of each of the types of 
flexibility identified in the previous literature, but to define a simple measure that 
embodies the most important dimensions of flexibility at the strategic level in the auto 
industry. We refer the reader to the review by Sethi and Sethi (1990) that identifies over 
50 ways to operationalize flexibility. 
Our primary measure of flexibility is an objective measure based on the demonstrated 
ability of a plant to produce multiple products in the same facility. This is what has been 
called mix flexibility or product flexibility in some taxonomies (for example, see Parker 
and Wirth 1999). Mix flexibility has been used in prior academic studies and is also used 
by analysts following the automotive industry. For example, the Prudential Report, a 
third party evaluation of the financial outlook of the various US car manufacturers, uses 
the number of nameplates manufactured in a production line as the criteria to define a 
plant as flexible. Lines producing more than one nameplate are considered flexible, 
while lines producing a single nameplate are considered inflexible.  
We use a binary variable to code flexibility. We define a production facility as 
flexible if it produces more than one platform. We choose the number of platforms as 
opposed to the number of products for our measure of mix flexibility because the 
number of platforms is more related to the necessary technological and managerial 
complexity in the plant (two “different” products can just be branded versions of the 
same vehicle). As an example, Figure 2.2 shows the allocation of platforms to plants for 
Nissan and Ford in the end of 2010. According to our measure, the four plants that 
Nissan has in North America were flexible in the end of 2010, while only five out of the 
thirteen North American plants that manufacture Ford vehicles were flexible. The figure 
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is just a snapshot, as flexibility has evolved over time. With substantial investments, an 
inflexible plant can become flexible. In some rare cases, a flexible plant can become 
inflexible. This can happen, for example, when one of the models manufactured in the 
plant is discontinued and leaves the plant with a single allocated platform. 
Since our sales and incentive data are at the model-month level, we assign a 
flexibility score to every model on a monthly basis. A model is given a high flexibility 
score in a given month if it has at least some production in a domestic (North American) 
flexible facility. Previous research has shown that partial flexibility can go a long way in 
achieving the benefits of full flexibility (Jordan and Graves 1995). This insight has been 
extended to multi-stage supply chains (Graves and Tomlin 2003), queuing settings 
(Bassamboo et al. 2008), and newsvendor settings (Bassamboo et al. 2010). Model 
flexibility changes over time, since a model can (a) be shifted from a flexible to an 
inflexible plant, (b) be shifted from an inflexible to a flexible plant, or (c) remain at a 
plant which changes its flexibility level because of changes in other models. This 
variation in model flexibility over time is essential for our identification strategy, as we 
discuss in Section 5.  
We consider fully imported models not flexible. Transportation adds a lead time of 
at least 4 to 6 weeks to the production time, meaning that firms have a limited ability to 
quickly adjust production to match changes in demand. The inability to adjust to 
demand because of poor mix flexibility and because of long lead times can have 
different effects. In order to make sure that our decision to code fully imported models 
as inflexible does not drive the results, we perform additional analyses without the fully 
imported models. Our results do not change qualitatively.  
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 Using our definition of flexibility, we can perform a simple comparison between the 
incentives given for models manufactured with flexibility and for models manufactured 
without flexibility. The average incentive for models that are produced with flexibility 
was $2,691 in 2007, while the average incentive for models that are produced without 
flexibility was $3,411 in the same year. Not all the difference between the two groups 
($720) comes necessarily from differences in flexibility. It could be, for example, that 
Japanese firms are more flexible and that Japanese firms also provide systematically 
lower discounts for reasons different from flexibility. A more refined econometric 
analysis is needed. 
Our flexibility measure is based on the demonstrated ability to produce a mix, but a 
plant could have this flexibility and choose not to use it. Moreover, a plant can produce 
multiple products but have each product allocated to an independent production line 
without mix flexibility. To strengthen our measure of flexibility, we also created 
flexibility scores of the plants based on the subjective assessment of an industry expert. 
Ron Harbour is widely acknowledged as a leading expert in understanding the US 
automotive industry. He has visited every single plant in the US automotive industry 
and has been the producer of the Harbour reports (now published through Oliver 
Wyman). We compared his subjective assessment that he kindly provided to us with our 
measure and found them to largely be consistent. We also performed our empirical 
analysis using his evaluation as the flexibility measure and found the results to be 
similar. To allow future research to replicate our results and build on our work, the 
remainder of this paper is based on the objective flexibility measure that we previously 
defined. 
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Estimation of the demand system 
A crude measure of demand volatility could be defined based on sales volatility. 
However, monthly sales depend on the incentives that are given. Ideally, we would like 
to measure the volatility of demand in absence of incentives. Since this is not possible, 
we have to create a structural model that models the underlying demand dynamics. We 
then can evaluate the counter-factual sales at non-discounted prices. Based on these 
sales data not polluted by price discounts, we can then generate our measure of 
volatility.   
We start by estimating the parameters of the demand curve Diym(p), which gives the 
demand for vehicle i in year y and month m. This demand depends on the price of 
vehicle i, attributes of vehicle i, the prices of all vehicles in the market other than i, and 
the attributes of all vehicles in the market other than i. 
The choice model that we use to estimate the demand system is a nested 
multinomial logit model. As in other multinomial models, each alternative (vehicle 
model) is defined as a bundle of attributes and consumers choose the one that gives 
them the highest utility or the outside option of not buying.  
The nested multinomial logit model has the advantage that it allows reasonable 
substitution patterns and avoids the independence of irrelevant alternatives problem 
present in multinomial logit models, which imply proportional substitution patterns 
between alternatives (for more details, see Train 2009). With respect to other similar 
models like the random coefficients logit (Berry et al. 1995), it has the advantage that it is 
more parsimonious and that we do not need to specify a distribution for the 
heterogeneity of consumer preferences. The flexibility in the substitution patterns is 
given by the nests. In the nested logit model, the set of alternatives is partitioned into 
 26 
 
subsets. Substitution patterns are proportional within nests, but can vary across nests. 
We use the combination of vehicle segment and luxury indicator variables in the 
construction of the nests (for example, a nest contains “luxury SUVs”).  
To estimate the model, we follow the transformation described in Berry (1994) and 
write : 
     0 |ln ln lnjt t jt jt jt g jts s x p s         (2.1)
 
where sjt, s0t and sjt|g are, respectively, the market shares of model j in time t, the share of 
the outside good (no purchase) in time t and the share of the nest g to which model j 
belongs in time t; xjt are the product characteristics, and jt  
is a shock unobserved to the 
econometrician. We do not observe the actual price pjt   faced by the consumer in time t. 
We approximate it as the list price minus the average incentive for model j at time t. As 
product characteristics, we use the vehicle size variables, a proxy for acceleration given 
by horsepower/weight and the miles per dollar, which depends on the current gas price 
and the MPG of the vehicle. We also include segment-time dummies.  
We use instrumental variables to account for price endogeneity. The instrumental 
variables that we use are based on Berry et al. (1995). We include the characteristics of 
the other models of the same manufacturer and the characteristics of the rest of the 
vehicles on the market (for more details, see Berry et al. 1995). Changes in the choice set 
(introduction and removal of models), changes in vehicle attributes, changes in gas 
prices, and segment trends captured by the dummy variables allow us to identify the 
coefficients of the demand model. Table 2.A1 reports the estimates of the demand 
system. 
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Evaluation of counterfactual sales at reference prices 
Once we have estimated the demand model, we can calculate counterfactual 
measures. We define CSALESiym=Diym(p) as the counterfactual sales that we would expect 
to observe for model i in year y and month m, if the vehicles were priced at a price vector 
p. For the choice of the vector p, we can use a reference price level that is not affected by 
the incentive behavior. We propose using the list prices, but other alternatives are also 
possible (e.g. using the average prices). 
The method allows us to construct an alternative series of counterfactual sales over 
the entire period of analysis. This series gives a measure of the underlying demand that 
is not contaminated by the incentives that the firms decided to give.  
 Generation of volatility measure 
Based on the counterfactual sales CSALESiym at a vector of reference prices, we 
compute demand volatility VOLm for a model as the coefficient of variation of this series: 
(CSALES )
(CSALES )
iym
m
iym
stdev
VOL
mean

 
 (2.2)
 
This gives a measure of demand volatility for each of the models in our dataset that 
is not contaminated by the incentive behavior. 
2.5. Econometric Specification and Identification 
Automotive manufacturers play a complex game in which the equilibrium 
decisions with regards to flexibility deployment, production and incentive will depend 
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on their demand and cost curves and those of their competitors. One potential approach 
to analyze their decisions would be to fully characterize the problem that firms are 
solving and to structurally estimate the model primitives. However, the lack of cost data 
and the number of interdependent decisions that firms are making limit the appeal of 
such an approach. Our approach is instead to focus on the equilibrium average 
relationship between flexibility and incentives under the demand patterns observed 
during our period of analysis. We start by modeling the impact of flexibility on 
discounts (incentives).  
We use a family of reduced form specifications that model discounts as:  
 (2.3)
 
where i is the model, t is the month and s(i) is the segment to which model i belongs. All 
specifications include itFLEX , the demonstrated flexibility measure described in Section 
4; i , a model fixed effect; ( )s i t , a variable that controls for segment-time interactions; 
and uit, the error term. The set of additional controls includes the variables
_ itDISCOUNT COMP , the MPDit, AGEit, INTRODUCTIONit, PHASE_OUTit and 
DESIGN_CHANGEit, described in Table 2.2.  
Hypothesis H1 (the deployment of flexibility is associated with a reduction of the 
average incentives) holds if  < 0, with  giving the magnitude of the impact of 
flexibility on discounts. 
Model fixed effects capture the contribution to discounts of any model 
characteristics that do not change over time (for example, being a model produced by a 
Japanese firm, being a Ford, being a Toyota Corolla or being an SUV are features that do 
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not change over time). The identification of the coefficients, including that of flexibility, 
will be based on temporal variations of the level of discounts for a given model. The 
identification of the coefficient of flexibility is achieved from vehicles that change from 
flexibility to inflexibility or vice versa. During our period of analysis, around 25% of the 
models experience some change in their flexibility score.  
As an example of the variation that helps to identify the coefficient of flexibility, 
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of incentives for two similar vehicles, the GMC Envoy 
and the Nissan Pathfinder.  Both vehicles were manufactured in inflexible plants until 
September 2004. The evolution of the average incentive is similar for both vehicles 
before that. In September 2004, the Nissan Pathfinder started to be produced in the 
flexible Smyrna Plant, making the model flexible according to our definition. After that, 
the average incentive for the Nissan Pathfinder dropped considerably, compared with 
the average incentive given for the GMC Envoy. Our econometric analysis does a more 
rigorous job by controlling for additional variables that may play a role before and after 
the deployment of flexibility. For example, in the period shown in Figure 2.3 there were 
also changes in MSRP. Therefore not all the difference in observed incentives comes 
from flexibility. 
Using flexible technology to produce a model is clearly an endogenous decision, 
since firms choose which models to produce with flexible technology and when. This 
decision might be based on factors that also affect the discount policy for the vehicle, 
and the specification shown above could result in biased estimates if the use of flexibility 
is correlated with any unobserved variable captured by the error term.   
Model fixed effects reduce the extent of the problem, because they account for 
any potentially ignored cross-sectional variable that might affect discounts and might be 
correlated with the adoption of flexibility. For example, labor practices that do not vary 
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much during our period of analysis. If there existed a labor practice (e.g. union status) 
that would be correlated with the error term (i.e. it would affect incentives once 
controlling for everything else we observe) and would be correlated with flexibility, not 
controlling for labor practices would lead to biased estimates.  Adding fixed effects deals 
with omitted variables (e.g. labor practices) that are constant over time for a given 
model.   
The potential endogeneity concern is further attenuated if we control for 
additional variables. In particular, some of our specifications control for the vehicle list 
price (MSRP), which is adjusted yearly. Unobserved changes in the demand conditions 
expected by the firm for a year, which can be potentially correlated with the adoption of 
flexibility, can be accounted for by observed changes in the list price. Also, all our 
specifications include segment-time dummies. They account for any temporal shocks 
that affect all models of a given segment. This includes any temporal trends in discounts 
at the segment level as well as any global industry trends.  
In order to be protected against any remaining source of flexibility endogeneity, 
we use instrumental variables. A good instrumental variable for the flexibility with 
which a model is produced should be correlated with the flexibility variable (relevance 
condition) and uncorrelated with the error term (exogeneity condition). We use the 
average flexibility of the rest of models of the same make as an instrument for the 
flexibility of a model. This instrument satisfies the relevance condition because there 
exists correlation in the adoption of flexibility for different plants of the same firm. On 
the other hand, we do not expect the discounts of a model to be affected by the flexibility 
of the other models of the firm, after including all our controls.. We have also used 
variations of the instrument (for example, excluding models that are manufactured in 
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the same plant as the model of interest in the calculation of the average flexibility) 
without substantial changes in the results 
The unit of observation for the specification described above is the model-month. 
Since the subjective assessment provided by the expert is at the plant level, we replicate 
the analysis at the plant level. In order to do that, we compute the production weighted 
incentive given at every plant. The econometric specification is the following: 
 
(2.4)
 
where DISCOUNTpt is the production weighted average incentive, FLEXpt is the plant 
flexibility measure, CONTROLSpt  include any plant level controls, p is a fixed effect, t is 
a set of time dummies and upt is the error term. Based on this specification, we can use 
either the objective measure of demonstrated mix flexibility or the subjective flexibility 
measure provided by the expert. 
In order to assess the impact of flexibility on utilization, we perform the analysis 
at the level of the manufacturing plant. We use the following specification: 
 (2.5)
 
 
where UTILpt is the plant utilization of plant p in month t, FLEXpt is the plant flexibility 
and CONTROLSpt  include any plant level controls. The model includes plant fixed 
effects and time effects. Again, the identification of the effect of flexibility comes from 
temporal variations in plant flexibility. Hypothesis H2 (the deployment of flexibility is 
0 1pt pt pt p t ptDISCOUNT FLEX CONTROLS u        
0 1pt pt pt p t ptUTIL FLEX CONTROLS u        
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associated with an increase in plant utilization) holds if  > 0, with  giving the 
magnitude of the impact of flexibility on discounts. 
Finally, in order to test Hypothesis H3 (firms give lower incentives for vehicles 
with low demand volatility), we focus on the cross-sectional variation, and we compute 
discount and volatility measures for each model. Our objective is to assess whether some 
of the cross-sectional differences between model discounts can be attributed to 
differences in demand volatility. Define: 
 (2.6)
 
where 
iDISCOUNT is the average discount given for model i during our period of 
analysis, and VOLi is the volatility of demand of model i during the period of analysis, 
calculated using the model described in Section 4. Note that this specification does not 
account for those variables affecting the average discount that were considered in our 
model described in Equation 2.3, such as flexibility and other controls. To incorporate 
the effect of those variables, we can use the model fixed effect i from (3) as the 
dependent variable. The model fixed effect represents the persistent model level shock 
in discounts, net of the effect of the other variables of the model. Define: 
 (2.7)
 
Hypothesis H3 holds if  > 0. Note that in this specification the analysis is cross-
sectional, and we have only one observation per model.  Equation 2.7 links the 
coefficient of variation of demand over the entire period with the model-fixed effect on 
the incentives. 
0 1i iVOL     
0 1i iDISCOUNT VOL    
 33 
 
2.6. Results 
We begin by estimating the models characterizing model level discounts 
(Equation 2.3). Table 2.3 shows the estimates using OLS. The first three columns focus 
on vehicles with some domestic production (that is, excluding fully imported vehicles), 
while Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the estimates using all the vehicles marketed in the U.S., 
including those that are fully imported.  
Columns 1 and 4 show the estimates including the flexibility and the competitor 
discounts variables and segment time interactions, but without any other controls and 
without including fixed effects. In both groups the flexibility coefficient is negative and 
significant, suggesting that flexibility is associated with lower discounts. However, in 
these cases endogeneity is a serious concern - flexible vehicles might have other 
characteristics that result in the observed lower discount activity.  
Columns 2 and 5 incorporate model fixed effects, which account for persistent 
unobserved variables at the model level. The effect of flexibility is still negative and 
significant when we add the model fixed effects (-202.4 for the models with domestic 
production and -300.5 for all the models). Columns 3 and 6 incorporate additional 
controls for some variables that change over time. The flexibility estimate remains 
almost constant across these models, which suggests that flexibility adoption is not 
correlated with those observed variables. Columns 3 and 6 are our preferred 
specifications in Table 2.3, as they include all controls. We observe an estimated effect of 
flexibility on discounts of -215.5 for vehicles with domestic production and -$293.8 for all 
vehicles. These coefficients can be interpreted as the average dollar savings in discounts 
that are obtained by switching a model from an inflexible facility to a flexible one. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by model. The results of Table 2.3 show that the 
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effect of flexibility is both statistically and economically significant. Flexibility explains 
about 10% of the average discount.   Discounts of the competitors in the segment are 
partially matched (around $0.25 per dollar of competitor discounts, when including the 
controls).  
Despite our extensive set of controls, the OLS specification estimated in Table 2.3 
can still suffer from an endogenous vehicle-to-flexibility assignment as described in 
Section 5. Table 2.4 shows the estimates when we use the average flexibility of the rest of 
the models of the same make as an instrument for flexibility and then estimate the 
model using 2SLS. Again, we separately report the results for the vehicles with domestic 
production (Columns 1 and 2) and for all vehicles (Columns 3 and 4). 
The estimates displayed in Table 4 show that the coefficient of flexibility is even 
more negative when using the instrumental variable estimation. The rest of coefficients 
remain largely unchanged. Our preferred specifications are the ones given in Columns 2 
and 4, which include all the control variables, besides the model fixed effects and the 
segment-time dummies. These columns suggest an effect of -699 and -1295 for the 
vehicles with domestic production and for all vehicles, respectively. Both the OLS and 
the 2SLS results show support for H1. In other words, the adoption of flexibility is 
associated with a reduction of discounts. In the IV model, the point estimates, which 
quantify the average effect of flexibility on discounts, change significantly compared to 
the OLS estimates. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test allows us to reject the hypothesis that 
the flexibility is exogenous (e.g. p=0.0054 for the specification shown in Column 2) and 
therefore the 2SLS method is suitable. However, as often is the case with IV estimation, 
we have to acknowledge that our instrument might have problems related to the 
violation of the two conditions, instrument exogeneity and relevance.  
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The IV model assumes that the discounts given for a model are not affected by 
the flexibility of the other plants. This instrument exogeneity condition is not testable in 
our case, because we only have one instrument. We are thus in the just-identified case. If 
the relevance condition is satisfied only weakly, it is well known that instrumental 
variables can have a small sample bias (for example, see Angrist and Pischke 2009). The 
instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable and the first stage for Column 2 
has an adjusted R-squared of 0.744, but the Partial R-squared is 0.06, which seems 
somewhat low, suggesting that we should be cautious because we might have a weak 
instrument. Another potential problem could be that the instrument might affect a 
particular subpopulation more significantly, and it also might be picking up additional 
effects, such us portfolio effects that might or might not be related to flexibility.  
Altogether, these potential problems with the instruments suggest that we 
should not take the 2SLS estimates at face value. But this does not mean that they are 
useless. The results of the instrumental variable estimation suggest that our OLS 
estimation, if biased, is probably biased upwards, and that the effect of flexibility on 
discounts is stronger than the effect estimated by OLS. Thus, we can consider our OLS 
results as a lower bound on the effect of flexibility.   
The modeling literature can offer some guidance in interpreting our findings and 
in understanding in what direction our OLS estimates are likely to be biased. Demand 
uncertainty has been identified as one of the key drivers of flexibility adoption (Fine and 
Freund 1990, Swaminathan and Lee 2003). We can argue what the likely direction of the 
bias would be if flexibility is adopted as a response to increased expected uncertainty for 
the demand of one model. Given that price adjustments in the auto industry are 
asymmetric (discounts from the list price are offered when demand is low but price 
premiums over the list price are never charged), a more uncertain demand will probably 
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result in higher average discounts. To see that, note that as the variance of the demand 
distribution increases, the size of the price adjustments downwards (if realized demand 
is low) or upwards (if realized demand is high) is expected to increase. Since the upward 
price increases are capped by the list price, we expect the average effect to result in 
higher discounts. If the flexibility adoption is correlated with expected uncertainty, our 
flexibility variable is likely to pick up part of the contribution of uncertainty to 
discounts, which is expected to be positive. This suggests that a potential correlation 
between the flexibility variable and the omitted uncertainty is positive. Therefore the 
OLS coefficient of flexibility would be biased upwards. This is consistent with the results 
that we find with our instrumental variable specification.  
In summary, our results indicate that under the observed market conditions 
between 2002 and 2009, flexibility accounts for average savings in discounts of between 
$200 and $700 per vehicle, for cars with domestic production. The results of the analysis 
using the subjective measure of flexibility are qualitatively similar and are shown in 
Table 2.A2 in the Appendix.  
Turning our attention to the effect of flexibility on utilization, Table 2.5 shows the 
estimates of the specification given by equation 5, for which the unit of observation is 
the plant-month. The model includes plant fixed effects and time effects. Columns 1 and 
2 use the mix flexibility variable described in Section 4. Columns 3 and 4 use a modified 
version based on the highest flexibility that a plant has had in the past. This modified 
version assumes that a plant that has become flexible stays flexible. 
All specifications have a positive coefficient for flexibility, supporting H2. 
Columns 1 and 3 do not include plant fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 control for plant 
fixed effects and provide lower estimates for the effect of flexibility. Column 2 uses our 
regular measure of plant flexibility, and the OLS estimate of the magnitude of the effect 
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of flexibility on utilization is 9.8%. Since the flexibility measure captures the 
demonstrated flexibility rather than the potential flexibility, there exists a potential 
endogeneity problem. A plant that is able to produce multiple platforms might only do 
so when demand for them is high. We also expect high utilization when demand for the 
products manufactured in a plant is high. Therefore, the effect attributed to flexibility 
might be actually related to unobserved demand shocks. In order to attenuate this 
potential problem, Column 4 shows the estimates when we build the plant flexibility 
variable based on historical data. We assume that a plant that has ever produced more 
than two platforms at the same time in the past remains flexible, even if the firm might 
decide not to use that flexibility. When doing that, the effect of flexibility on utility is 
attenuated, and is estimated to be around 4%. In all cases, the results support our 
Hypothesis H2. The average plant has the capacity to produce around 15,000 vehicles 
per month. Increasing utilization by 4% is roughly equivalent to producing a total of 600 
more vehicles per month. If the fixed costs of operating the plant do not increase, 
adopting flexibility results in lower fixed costs per vehicle sold and more efficient capital 
investments. 
Finally, we estimate the specifications (2.6) and (2.7). For these specifications, the 
unit of observation is the model (one observation for the entire period). The two 
specifications differ in the dependent variable, but both analyze how the demand 
volatility of a model (calculated as described in Section 4) affects the incentives. Table 2.6 
shows the results. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the mean incentive for the 
model. In Column 2, we use the model fixed effect of specification (3) as the dependent 
variable, and we analyze how the demand volatility of a model affects the part of the 
incentives that is unexplained by the variables included in specification (3).  
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We use a log transformation for our volatility variable. We see that the coefficient 
of demand volatility is positive in both cases, and therefore Hypothesis H3 holds. We 
conclude that firms give lower incentives for vehicles with low demand volatility. Figure 
2.4 plots the model fixed effect vs the log of the demand volatility. The first subplot 
shows the data at the model level and suggests the positive association between 
flexibility and incentives that we observe in Table 2.6. The second subplot shows the 
aggregation of the data at the make level. Again, we see a positive association. 
A couple of makes stand out in Figure 2.4 (Smart, Mini, Lexus and Porsche) as 
they have unusually low fixed effect on the incentive and unusually low demand 
volatility. These are makes that are able to avoid giving incentives regardless of their 
flexibility, thanks to their low underlying demand volatility. This suggests that besides 
using flexibility, there are other tools that firms can use control incentives, and that some 
makes are “robust by design” against shocks in demand. 
2.7. Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
Our main measure of flexibility, the measure based on the demonstrated mix 
flexibility described in Section 4, has several potential shortcomings. In Section 4, we 
have presented an alternative subjective measure based on an expert assessment, and we 
have shown above that the results obtained with such a measure were qualitatively 
similar. We find that the measures based on the demonstrated flexibility and the 
flexibility measures based on the expert’s assessment are highly correlated (>0.8). 
Besides validating our results with the subjective measure, we have performed a series 
of robustness checks to our analysis with the demonstrated flexibility measure.  
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One of the potential shortcomings of our demonstrated flexibility measure is the 
fact that it is based on what the plants choose to product, rather than what the plants can 
produce. For example, we have noticed that in some (infrequent) cases a flexible plant 
produces only one model during a short period of time. In order to address this, we 
have redefined our flexibility measure as the maximum flexibility observed over the last 
n months (with n=3 and n=6), finding estimates that are consistent with the results that 
we have described. In the plant level analysis, we have also used the “record” flexibility, 
that is, the maximum historical flexibility for the plant (see Table 2.5), again, with 
qualitatively similar results. 
Another potential shortcoming of our measure is that we do not have production 
data at the line level but at the plant level. However, having multiple platforms 
produced in independent lines of the same plant is not much different from having 
independent plants. This could result in an overestimation of the available flexibility in 
some cases. To address this potential problem, we have identified the cases where this 
could have been an issue by examining the number of lines per plant. We obtain that 
information from the Harbour Reports. Our results are robust to excluding those 
observations.   
We have also tested for alternative definitions of our incentive variable. For 
example, in specification 2.3 we used the monetary amount of the discounts, but our 
results are robust to using log transformations and also to using a relative measure of 
discounts, expressing them as a percentage of the list price.   
The analysis shown in Section 6 focuses on short run pricing given by discounts 
from the MSRP. The effect of flexibility on prices depends on the effect of flexibility on 
MSRP. It could be the case that after deploying flexibility lower discounts are 
accompanied by lower list prices. This would result in an ambiguous effect on final 
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transaction prices and on manufacturer revenue per car. The relation between flexibility 
and list prices is given by the following specification: 
 (2.8)
 
Table 2.7 shows the impact of flexibility on MSRP, according to specification 2.8, 
where the unit of observation is the model-month. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS 
estimates, columns 3 and 4 show the 2SLS estimates using the same instruments as for 
Table 2.4. All columns include model fixed effects and segment time interactions. Except 
for the OLS estimation with all vehicles, the coefficient of flexibility in all regressions is 
positive and significant and we conclude that flexibility is not associated with lower list 
prices. 
Having established that prices and average revenue per car increase after 
deploying flexibility, it is interesting to analyze whether this is at the expense of sales. 
We have conducted several tests on whether flexibility is associated with a sales 
decrease, but this hypothesis can be rejected (see Table 2.A3). Therefore, our estimates 
for the effect of flexibility on discounts provide lower bounds on the average effect of 
flexibility on revenues per car. 
Regarding the explanation of the phenomenon we are describing, our preferred 
one is that flexibility allows to better match supply and demand, and having fewer and 
less important supply-demand mismatches allows to avoid using incentives. An 
alternative explanation would be based on cost. Lower discounts could be also derived 
from the fact that the marginal costs of production are higher with flexibility. However, 
observe that sales do not decrease after flexibility is deployed. It is difficult to explain 
why customers would be willing to buy more and at higher prices.  
0 1it it it i st itMSRP FLEX CONTROLS u        
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2.8. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper we have illustrated some of the benefits of deploying production 
flexibility. We have shown that the deployment of production flexibility is associated 
with savings in discounts of between $200 and $700 per vehicle during our period of 
analysis, 2002-2009. We have shown that list prices (MSRP) increase with the use of 
flexibility, and therefore both transaction prices and manufacturer revenue per car 
increase when vehicles are produced with flexibility. Flexibility is not the only lever that 
firms can use to avoid using discounts. Designing products that are robust to shocks in 
demand is an alternative strategy, as suggested from the fact that vehicles with low 
demand volatility engage less often in discounting activity. We have also shown that 
flexibility is associated with higher utilization, 4% more on average. All the rest being 
equal, achieving higher utilization allows firms to reduce the fixed cost per vehicle, and 
therefore to increase average profits.   
To see the managerial importance of flexibility and the results presented in this 
paper, consider the following, back-on-the-envelope calculation. Ford sells about 150K 
vehicles per month. If, through flexibility, Ford could reduce its discounts by the most 
conservative amount we estimated ($200), our model suggests incremental profits of 
150K*$200=30M$ per month. This does not include the benefits of higher plant 
utilizations and potentially increased sales (see our results of Tables 2.5 and 2.A3). Of 
course, when evaluating the deployment of flexibility, firms have to also examine the 
associated costs. The costs of flexibility depend highly on the current plant and product 
portfolio of the firm. For newly built plants, the costs of a flexible plant and the costs of 
an inflexible plant are nowadays very similar. But the capital investment of a new plant 
is huge, and firms typically update and retool existing plants. The cost of doing that 
depends on the plant technology and the models that are going to be manufactured. It is 
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therefore difficult to give a universal measure for the costs of flexibility. As a reference 
point, consider Ford’s plans to retool its Wayne (MI) plant, which is estimated to require 
a $550 million investment. Rather than illustrating a cost benefit analysis for each 
manufacturer, we have presented our estimates of the average benefit of flexibility based 
on discount savings. Firms can combine our results and methodology with their detailed 
information about their cost structure and current capital equipment in order to evaluate 
the convenience of investing in flexibility. 
As far as the implication for the academic community is concerned, we believe 
that the models that we present in this paper open up several opportunities for future 
research. We have developed a model of customer demand rather than relying on sales 
as a proxy for demand. This allows us to integrate the pricing decision into the analysis, 
something that has been done in the modeling literature, but not in prior empirical 
work. Within the realm of flexibility, one potential extension using a similar approach 
could be to analyze the flexibility investment decision jointly with the demand system. 
More generally, future research can estimate the impact of other operational variables, 
including product variety, fuel efficiency or the timing of new product launches. 
Empirical models of pricing could be particularly fruitful in studying the interplay 
between pricing and inventory decisions. This area has been the subject of several 
modeling papers but there is little empirical research complementing the theoretical 
results.  
2.9. References 
Angrist, J.D., J.S. Pischke. 2009. Mostly harmless econometrics: an empiricist’s 
companion. Princeton Univ Press. 
 43 
 
Anupindi, Ravi, Li Jiang. 2008. Capacity investment under postponement strategies, 
market competition, and demand uncertainty. Management Science 54(11) 1876–1890.  
Aviv, Y., A. Federgruen. 2001. Design for postponement: a comprehensive 
characterization of its benefits under unknown demand distributions. Operations 
Research 578–598. 
Bassamboo, A., R.S. Randhawa, J.A. Van Mieghem. 2008. A little flexibility is all you 
need: Optimality of tailored chaining and pairing. Working Paper. 
Bassamboo, A., R.S. Randhawa, J.A. Van Mieghem. 2010. Optimal flexibility 
configurations in newsvendor networks: Going beyond chaining and pairing. 
Management Science 56(8) 1285. 
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, A. Pakes. 1995. Automobile prices in market equilibrium. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 63(4) 841–890. 
Berry, S.T. 1994. Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. The 
RAND Journal of Economics 25(2) 242–262. 
Bish, Ebru K., Qiong Wang. 2004. Optimal investment strategies for flexible 
resources, considering pricing and correlated demands. Operations Research 52(6) 954–
964.  
Bitran, G., R. Caldentey. 2003. An overview of pricing models for revenue 
management. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(3) 203–229. 
Busse, M., J. Silva-Risso, F. Zettelmeyer. 2006. 1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of 
Auto Manufacturer Promotions. The American Economic Review 96(4) 1253–1270. 
Busse, M.R., C.R. Knittel, F. Zettelmeyer. 2009. Pain at the Pump: The Differential 
Effect of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile Markets. NBER working paper . 
Cachon, G.P., M.A. Lariviere. 1999. Capacity allocation using past sales: When to 
turn-and-earn. Management Science 45(5) 685–703. 
 44 
 
Cachon, G.P., M. Olivares. 2010. Drivers of finished-goods inventory in the US 
automobile industry. Management Science 56(1) 202–216. 
Ceryan, O., Sahin, O., Duenyas, I. 2011. Dynamic Pricing of Substitutable Products in 
the Presence of Capacity Flexibility. Working Paper. 
Chod, Jiri, Nils Rudi. 2005. Resource flexibility with responsive pricing. Operations 
Research 53(3) 532–548.  
Eliashberg, J., R. Steinberg. 1987. Marketing-production decisions in an industrial 
channel of distribution. Management Science 33(8) 981–1000. 
Elmaghraby, W., P. Keskinocak. 2003. Dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory 
considerations: Research overview, current practices, and future directions. Management 
Science 49(10) 1287–1309. 
Federgruen, A., A. Heching. 1999. Combined pricing and inventory control under 
uncertainty. Operations Research 47(3) 454–475. 
Fine, Charles H., Robert M. Freund. 1990. Optimal investment in product-flexible 
manufacturing capacity. Management Science 36(4) 449–466.  
Fisher, M., K. Rajaram, A. Raman. 2001. Optimizing inventory replenishment of 
retail fashion products. Manufacturing & service operations management 3(3) 230. 
Fisher, M., K. Ramdas, K. Ulrich. 1999. Component sharing in the management of 
product variety: A study of automotive braking systems. Management Science 45(3) 297–
315. 
Fisher, M.L., C.D. Ittner. 1999. The impact of product variety on automobile 
assembly operations: Empirical evidence and simulation analysis. Management Science 
771–786. 
Gallego, G., G. Van Ryzin. 1994. Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with 
stochastic demand over finite horizons. Management Science 40(8) 999–1020. 
 45 
 
Gaur, V., M.L. Fisher, A. Raman. 2005. An econometric analysis of inventory 
turnover performance in retail services. Management Science 51(2) 181–194. 
Gopal, A., Goyal, M., Netessine, S., Reindorp, M. 2011. The Impact of New Product 
Introduction on Plant Productivity in the North American Automotive Industry. 
Working Paper. 
Goyal, M., S. Netessine, T. Randall. 2006. Deployment of manufacturing flexibility: 
An empirical analysis of the North American automotive industry. Proceedings, MSOM 
Conference, 2006. 
Goyal, M., S. Netessine. 2007. Strategic technology choice and capacity investment 
under demand uncertainty. Management Science 53(2) 192–207.  
Goyal, M., S. Netessine. 2011. Volume Flexibility, Product Flexibility of both: the Role 
of Demand Correlation and Product Substitution. Manufacturing & Service Operations 
Management, Vol. 13, No. 2, 180-193. 
Graves, Stephen C., Brian T. Tomlin. 2003. Process flexibility in supply chains. 
Management Science 49(7) 907–919.  
Gupta, S. 1988. Impact of sales promotions on when, what, and how much to buy. 
Journal of Marketing Research 25(4) 342–355. 
Huckman, Robert S., and Darren Zinner. 2008. Does Focus Improve Operational 
Performance? Lessons from the Management of Clinical Trials. Strategic Management 
Journal 29(2): 173-193. 
Iyer, A., S. Seshadri, R. Vasher. 2009. Toyota’s Supply Chain Management: A Strategic 
Approach to Toyota’s Renowned System. McGraw Hill Professional. 
Kc, Diwas, Christian Terwiesch, The Role of Focus in Operational Performance: A 
Study of California Hospitals, Management Science (forthcoming) 
Jordan, William C., Stephen C. Graves. 1995. Principles on the benefits of 
manufacturing process flexibility. Management Science 41(4) 577–594.  
 46 
 
MacDuffie, J.P., K. Sethuraman, M.L. Fisher. 1996. Product variety and 
manufacturing performance: evidence from the international automotive assembly plant 
study. Management Science 42(3) 350–369. 
Neslin, S.A. 2002. Sales promotion. Handbook of marketing 310–38. 
Parker, R.P., A. Wirth. 1999. Manufacturing flexibility: measures and relationships. 
European journal of operational research 118(3) 429–449.  
Ramey, V.A., D.J. Vine. 2006. Declining volatility in the US automobile industry. The 
American Economic Review 96(5) 1876–1889. 
Sethi, A.K., S.P. Sethi. 1990. Flexibility in manufacturing: a survey. International 
Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems 2(4) 289–328. 
Suarez, F.F., M.A. Cusumano, C.H. Fine. 1996. An empirical study of manufacturing 
flexibility in printed circuit board assembly. Operations Research 44(1) 223–240. 
Train, K. 2003. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Van Mieghem, Jan A. 1998. Investment strategies for flexible resources. Management 
Science 44(8) 1071–1078.  
Van Mieghem, Jan A., Maqbool Dada. 1999. Price versus production postponement: 
Capacity and competition. Management Science 45(12) 1631–1649. 
Van Mieghem, Jan A. 2008. Operations Strategy: Principles and Practice. Dynamic 
Ideas.  
 
  
 47 
 
2.10. Tables. 
Table 2.1:  Average Trade Incentives (2003-2009) 
Company  Mean  as % of MSRP  
Porsche  809  1.10% 
Honda  1,024  4.00% 
Toyota  1,083  4.30% 
Daimler  2,469  4.80% 
BMW  2,691  5.80% 
Subaru  1,470  5.80% 
Volkswagen  2,041  7.30% 
Nissan  2,170  8.30% 
Mazda  2,040  8.60% 
Hyundai Group  2,252  11.00% 
Mitsubishi  2,776  12.00% 
Chrysler  3,682  13.00% 
Ford  3,585  13.00% 
General Motors  3,587  13.00% 
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Table 2.2: Variables 
Variable  Description  
 
DISCOUNTit 
 
Average incentive given for model i in month t 
FLEXit Binary variable that indicates if model i is flexible in month t, according to 
the measure described in Section 4  
DISCOUNT_COMPit For every model, we compute the average incentive per car given by the 
competitors in models of the same segment and luxury level  
MSRPit Median list price of the model, constant during the model year.   
MPDit Miles per dollar. The evolution of gas prices changes the attractiveness of 
some models. Incentives might respond to that. We define 
MPD=MPG/gasprice. This variable changes over time for a given model 
according to the evolution of gas prices. 
 
AGEit Number of years since the model was first introduced 
 
INTRODUCTIONit Dummy variable that is 1 in the model year when the model is 
introduced 
 
PHASE_OUTit  Dummy variable that is 1 for observations that correspond to the last year 
in which a model is produced and for observations after  
production for the model has stopped 
 
DESIGN_CHANGEit  Dummy variable that is 1 when there has been a change in vehicle 
characteristics that might relate to changes in design with respect to the 
previous model year 
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Table 2.3: OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Only Domestic All Vehicles 
            
FLEX -676.9*** -202.4*** -215.5*** -196.5*** -300.5*** -293.8*** 
 
(37.80) (43.90) (42.69) (34.07) (43.52) (42.51) 
DISCOUNT_COMP  0.161*** 0.368*** 0.238*** 0.154*** 0.388*** 0.267*** 
 
(0.0436) (0.0357) (0.0341) (0.0320) (0.0300) (0.0305) 
 
 
  
 
  MODEL FIXED EFFECTS No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
 
  
 
  
SEGMENT-TIME DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
 
  
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS No No Yes+  No No Yes+  
 
 
  
 
  
Constant 1,790*** 690.4*** -2,588*** 1,148*** 436.3*** -2,211*** 
 
(196.3) (91.65) (276.2) (136.1) (73.31) (248.9) 
 
 
  
 
  Observations 10,043 10,043 9,929 17,166 17,166 17,052 
R-squared 0.169 0.721 0.747 0.133 0.690 0.707 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ indicates the following controls:  INTRODUCTION, PHASE_OUT, AGE, MPD, MSRP, 
DESIGN_CHANGE 
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Table 2.4: IV estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
2SLS 
VARIABLES Only domestic All Vehicles 
          
FLEX -576.9*** -699.0*** -1,280*** -1,295*** 
 
(187.7) (177.7) (233.9) (226.1) 
DISCOUNT_COMP 0.388*** 0.264*** 0.373*** 0.250*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0338) (0.0297) (0.0302) 
     MODEL FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     SEGMENT-TIME DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     ADDITIONAL CONTROLS No Yes+ No Yes+ 
     Constant 1,273*** 767.3 1,202*** 806.0* 
 
(224.4) (492.6) (363.6) (461.8) 
     Observations 10,034 9,923 17,064 16,953 
R-squared 0.719 0.743 0.679 0.695 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ indicates the following controls:  INTRODUCTION, PHASE_OUT, AGE, 
MPD, MSRP, DESIGN_CHANGE 
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Table 2.5: Flexibility and plant utilization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES UTIL UTIL UTIL UTIL 
         
FLEX 0.138*** 0.0980***  
 
 
(0.00837) (0.0121)  
 FLEX_RECORD  
 
0.113*** 0.0377*** 
 
 
 
(0.00858) (0.0136) 
PLANT FIXED EFFECTS No Yes No Yes 
CONSTANT 0.522*** 0.481*** 0.392*** 0.379*** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0321) (0.0350) (0.0261) 
 
 
 
 
 Observations 7,606 7,606 7,606 7,606 
R-squared 0.193 0.520 0.190 0.517 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.6: Incentives and demand volatility 
  (1) (2) 
 
 
 VARIABLES Mean Incentive Model Fixed Effect 
     
L_VOL 2,030*** 1,368*** 
 
(189.6) (253.2) 
Constant 3,981*** 731.1*** 
 
(131.8) (175.9) 
 
 
 Observations 325 296 
R-squared 0.262 0.090 
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Table 2.7: MSRP and flexibility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
VARIABLES Only domestic All vehicles Only domestic All vehicles 
          
FLEX 274.9*** 72.27 2,104*** 1,370*** 
 
(56.78) (68.75) (282.0) (304.7) 
Constant 27,501*** 29,877*** 12,052*** 10,527*** 
 
(103.0) (85.04) (241.3) (259.5) 
     Observations 10,044 17,167 10,035 17,065 
R-squared 0.979 0.986 0.976 0.985 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All columns include the following controls:  INTRODUCTION, PHASE_OUT, 
AGE,DESIGN_CHANGE 
 
Table 2.A1:  Estimates of the Demand System 
  (1) 
 
IV Nested Logit 
VARIABLES MS 
    
MODEL_PRICE -9.30e-05*** 
 
(1.13e-06) 
SIZE 0.000208*** 
 
(5.58e-06) 
HPWT 18.63*** 
 
(0.700) 
MPD -0.0354*** 
 
(0.00358) 
L_MKSHIINSEG 0.805*** 
 
(0.0145) 
CONSTANT -3.700*** 
 
(0.186) 
  Observations 17,683 
R-squared 0.729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Includes segment-time  interactions 
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Table 2.A2: Subjective assessment of flexibility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
  VARIABLES AVG_INC AVG_INC AVG_INC AVG_INC 
          
MIX_FLEX -772.8*** -218.0*** 
  
 
(55.17) (59.22) 
  HARBOUR_FLEX 
  
-448.2*** -821.7*** 
   
(129.5) (180.1) 
PLANT FIXED EFFECTS No Yes No  Yes 
Constant 2,822*** 2,871*** 3,607*** 3,945*** 
 
(209.6) (112.1) (326.1) (229.5) 
     Observations 4,427 4,427 1,221 1,221 
R-squared 0.075 0.698 0.027 0.730 
   
     Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Columns 1 and 2 show the effect of the demonstrated mix flexibility on plant 
level average incentives. We observe that those effects are similar to the ones found at 
the model level. Columns 3 and 4 show the effect of the subjective assessment of 
flexibility on plant level average discounts. We observe that they are also negative and 
statistically and economically significant. 
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Table 2.A3: Flexibility and sales 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     VARIABLES SALES SALES SALES SALES 
          
FLEX 495.1*** 468.3*** 509.7*** 282.7** 
 
(136.9) (135.6) (135.1) (114.5) 
INCENTIVE 
  
0.215*** 0.305*** 
   
(0.0312) (0.0278) 
PROD 
   
0.267*** 
    
(0.0147) 
MODEL FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     SEGMENT-TIME DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     ADDITIONAL CONTROLS No Yes+  Yes+  Yes+  
     Observations 10,044 9,930 9,930 9,930 
R-squared 0.886 0.888 0.888 0.907 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 55 
 
2.11. Figures. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Production (left) and incentive (right) data for Ford Edge vs Honda 
Pilot. 
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Figure 2.2: Allocation of platforms to North American plants at Nissan (left) and 
Ford (right) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Average incentive for GMC Envoy and Nissan Pathfinder 
GMC 
Envoy 
Nissan 
Pathfinder 
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Figure 2.4. Model fixed effects and demand volatility. a) Model level. b) Make 
averages.  
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Chapter 3 
Reputation in Online Service 
Marketplaces2 
Abstract 
Online service marketplaces allow service buyers to post their project requests 
and service providers to bid for them. In order to reduce the transactional risks, 
marketplaces typically track and publish previous seller performance as a numerical 
reputation score. By analyzing a detailed dataset with more than 1,800,000 bids 
corresponding to 270,000 projects posted between 2001 and 2010 in a leading online 
intermediary for software development services, we empirically study the effects of 
reputation on market outcomes. We find that buyers trade off reputation and price and 
are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable bidders. Sellers increase their 
bids with their reputation score, but primarily use a superior reputation to increase their 
probability of being selected as opposed to increasing their price. We study how various 
variables moderate the importance of the reputation score: we observe that the 
reputation score has a smaller effect in situations where there exists a previous 
relationship between buyer and seller, when the seller has certified his or her skills, 
when the seller is local, or in situations that prompt higher interpersonal trust.   
                                                     
2 This chapter is based on Moreno, A., C. Terwiesch and E. Krasnokutskaya. 2012. Doing 
Business with Strangers: An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in Online Service Marketplaces. 
Working Paper. 
 60 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Online reverse auctions have been used since the 1990s for procurement in large 
corporations, but recent technological developments have enabled small- and medium-
sized enterprises and even individuals to use similar mechanisms to fulfill their service 
procurement needs. Platforms offering online service marketplaces matching buyers and 
sellers of services have proliferated, with some of the leading examples being 
www.vworker.com, www.elance.com, www.guru.com and www.odesk.com. In the late 
2000s, the financial crisis increased the number of self-employed professionals and the 
need for small firms and entrepreneurs to drive down costs, which resulted in an 
increase of the use of the most popular service procurement platforms (The Economist 
2010, Hipple 2010).  
Online service marketplaces are intermediaries that connect buyers and sellers of 
services. Buyers are firms or individuals who post work they would like to procure (for 
example, the development of an iPhone application) and request bids for this work. 
Sellers are firms or individuals (for example, iPhone developers) who bid for the jobs 
posted by buyers. Such online service marketplaces present distinctive traits in contrast 
to their offline counterparts. Traditional markets often involve personal relationships 
that can generate trust, especially when there is repeated interaction. In online service 
marketplaces, buyers have little information about bidders, and little control over their 
work, which leads to increased adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and to a 
higher uncertainty regarding the outcome of the collaboration. In such an uncertain 
environment, reputation and trust play a crucial role. Reputation creates a link between 
past behavior and the expectation of future behavior (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). The 
intermediary platform typically offers a reputation system that keeps track of the 
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buyers’ and bidders’ past behavior and facilitates trust (Resnick et al. 2000, Resnick and 
Zeckhouser 2002, Dellarocas 2003).  
Online service marketplaces also differ substantially from online marketplaces 
for products (e.g., eBay), for which there already exists an impressive amount of 
research studying the role of reputation (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 2003, Houser and 
Wouders 2005, Resnick et al. 2006, Cabral and Hortacsu 2010). The most important 
differences are the form of the auction, the service auction’s global footprint, and the 
difficulty to specify the seller’s effort. Online service marketplaces as studied in this 
paper take the form of reverse auctions, where the sellers submit bids in response to 
buyers’ requests for project work. This allows sellers to use their reputation score to 
increase their pricing power. Moreover, given the multiple bids with varying prices and 
reputation scores, the buyer faces a multi-attribute auction. Hence, unlike in the 
commonly studied eBay setting, price alone is not likely to predict the winning bid (in 
our sample, more than 40% of the projects were not awarded to the lowest bid). In 
absence of a physical product and the associated shipping needs, online service 
marketplaces also tend to have a global footprint. This is further accentuated by the 
opportunity for global wage rate arbitrage. In such global setting, the legal context 
governing the transaction is highly ambiguous, and thus buyers need to rely on 
reputation more than on potential litigation. Finally, given the skills of the seller, the 
accuracy of the specifications, the time it takes to complete the work, and the potential 
fraudulent seller behavior, the uncertainty associated with the quality of a service 
transaction is larger than for physical goods. This uncertainty can lead to post-
contractual opportunism and thus further increases the importance of reputation. 
Despite the growing importance of online service marketplaces and the special 
importance that reputation plays in them, there exists, to the best of our knowledge, no 
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prior empirical work analyzing the role of reputation in such settings. One explanation 
for this gap in research relates to the availability of data. eBay transactions are visible to 
the public, and the product is predictably rewarded to the highest bid. In contrast, in 
online service marketplaces, the bids are not visible to the public and the multi-attribute 
nature of the auction makes predicting the winning bid difficult, if not impossible. 
Through collaboration with vWorker (formerly rentacoder.com), one of the leading 
marketplaces for software development and other business services, we have obtained 
access to an extensive proprietary dataset. Our dataset includes more than 1,800,000 bids 
corresponding to more than 270,000 projects posted between 2001 and 2010 by 122,000 
coders. This dataset includes participants from over 80 countries.  In fact, more than 85% 
of the projects have the buyer and the winning seller located in different countries. A 
unique feature of our data is that we observe all the transactions in the market and 
during a long period of time, so that we are also able to follow buyers and sellers over 
time. This allows us to study how sellers adjust their bid setting strategy as their 
reputation changes.  
We use a discrete choice framework to study how buyers choose between 
competing bids from different service providers and how they trade off different 
attributes, focusing primarily on the role of reputation. Our econometric approach, 
together with the unique data set we assembled, allows us to make the following 
contributions.  
First, we show that in the multi-attribute auction context created by the online 
service marketplace we study, buyers trade off the cost of the service with the reputation 
of the seller. We find a significant and large reputation premium. One additional point 
in the reputation score (out of 10) has approximately the same effect on bid choice as a 
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reduction by one standard deviation in the bid amount. This extends prior research that 
has been done on product auctions. 
Second, we show that bidders internalize the fact that reputation is valuable to 
buyers, and adjust their bidding strategy as they accumulate reputation. Bidders start by 
bidding low when their reputation is low or unestablished, so that they can build 
reputation. They increase their bids as their reputation improves. However, bidders 
adjust their bid prices to a lesser extent than the buyers adjust choices. One additional 
point in the reputation score (in a range 0-10) is associated with an increase in bid 
equivalent to 1% of the standard deviation of the bids received for a project. In other 
words, the coders benefit from their increased reputation mostly through higher 
volume, rather than through higher prices. 
Third, we analyze the moderators of reputation. Our data presents significant 
variation not only in reputation scores but also in other available information and 
attributes of the coder. This allows us to study how the effect of the reputation score 
interacts with other variables. We show that reputation is less important for coders who 
have certified their skills by taking an online test, for coders who are from the same 
country as the buyer, for coders with whom the buyer has worked before, and for coders 
who leave cues that prompt interpersonal trust, like posting a picture in their profile. We 
interpret these findings according to existing economic and behavioral theories. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related 
literature. Section 3 introduces the empirical setting and describes the institutional 
details of the market. Section 4 develops hypotheses based on previous research. Section 
5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the econometric specification and the results of 
the estimation of the models. Finally, Section 7 concludes by pointing at some of the 
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managerial implications of our findings and at some areas of current and future 
research.  
3.2.  Literature Review 
Our study of reputation in online service marketplaces has close connections to 
literature streams in information systems, operations management, economics and 
management of organizations. 
This paper is closely related to the information systems literature that studies 
reputation in online auctions and its effect on market outcomes. Most of the work in this 
domain has focused on product auctions, especially in the eBay market (Bajari and 
Hortacsu 2003, Houser and Wouders 2005, Resnick et al. 2006, Cabral and Hortacsu 
2010, among others). Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) reviews some of the most relevant 
papers, which overall find some evidence supporting the claim that seller reputation has 
a positive effect on prices in eBay auctions. Some recent work in information systems 
has focused on the role of online reputation systems and, more generally, online 
feedback mechanisms. Dellarocas (2003) and Dellarocas (2006) provide comprehensive 
reviews. Bolton et al. (2004) perform an experimental investigation on the effectiveness 
of electronic reputation mechanisms. Bakos and Dellarocas (2011) compare litigation and 
online reputation as quality assurance mechanisms using analytical models. Other 
papers address some of these issues empirically using observational data. For example, 
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) study the effect of word of mouth on sales, and Dellarocas 
and Wood (2008) study the feedback mechanism at eBay and the impact of reciprocity 
and the informativeness of missing reviews. Some recent papers use text mining 
techniques to study the importance of user feedback and reviews (Ghose at al. 2009, 
Archak et al. 2011).  
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The operations management community has devoted considerable efforts to 
study procurement auctions. Most of the papers describe analytical models (e.g., 
Elmaghraby 2000, 2004, Tunca and Zenios 2006, Wan and Beil 2009). Pinker et al. (2003) 
provide a review of the literature related to the management of online auctions. Some 
recent work has also focused on markets for the procurement of innovation (e.g., 
Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Yang et al. 2011). Despite the abundance of theoretical models, 
there is very limited work studying online service marketplaces or procurement 
auctions empirically.  Among those, Gefen and Carmel (2008) study offshoring and 
global trade in online service marketplaces, Stanton and Thomas (2010) analyze the role 
of intermediary agencies in screening candidates in online labor markets, Snir and Hitt 
(2003) study the effects of costly bidding in internet-based procurement of professional 
services, and Tunca et al. (2011) study online procurement auctions for legal services by 
General Electric. Our paper complements this literature in procurement auctions by 
analyzing the role of reputation in markets for service procurement.  
The economics literature has provided a significant number of models to analyze 
reputation. Some general references are Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), Mailath and 
Samuelson (2006), and MacLeod (2007). The reputation models can be roughly 
categorized into two frameworks. The first framework deals with reputation as Bayesian 
updating on a hidden type (Kreps and Wilson 1982, Kreps et al. 1982). Under this 
framework, the reputation system has predominantly a signaling role – in our particular 
case, it would give information about the skill and trustworthiness of the coder. The 
second framework sees reputation as a coordination equilibrium in a repeated game 
context (Klein and Leffler 1981). Under this framework, reputation has mainly a 
sanctioning role – in our particular case, the threat of a bad rating would induce high 
effort on the coder side. In reality, these two frameworks are stylized extremes that 
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allow us to focus on isolated sources of information asymmetry (pure signaling vs. pure 
moral hazard). In practice, both sources of information asymmetry are important in 
these markets (see Cabral 2005 and Dellarocas 2006 for a more detailed description of 
the frameworks). Our paper uses these models to formulate hypotheses about the effect 
of the reputation score on outcomes and to interpret the results.  
Finally, our work is also related to the trust literature in management of 
organizations. In this literature, trust has been defined as “the willingness of a party to 
be vulnerable to the actions of another party  based  on  the  expectation  that  the  other  
will  perform  a particular  action  important  to  the  trustor,  irrespective  of  the  ability  
to monitor  or control  that  other part,” (Mayer et al., 1995). While the economic 
literature has discussed trust normatively as arising from the equilibrium of a repeated 
game (Cabral 2005), the literature in management of organizations literature has 
followed a more behavioral approach and typically grounds trust in psychological 
processes analogous to the processes that facilitate collaboration. Trust is a subjective 
measure that is influenced by the context in which transactions take place and by the 
individuals’ biases. For example, the literature in organizational psychology has 
identified situations that prompt interpersonal trust, such as homophily (people are 
more likely to trust similar people) or familiarity (see Brass 2011), and some research in 
psychology and in human-computer interface has pointed out the importance of 
anthropomorphism (people are more willing to trust human agents than nonhuman 
agents) (see Waytz et al. 2010). Our work discusses the role of some of these behavioral 
drivers of trust in the choices made by buyers in an online service marketplace and, in 
particular, we explore how interpersonal trust moderates the influence of the 
quantitative information provided by the reputation system.  
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To our knowledge, no paper has empirically studied reputation mechanisms in 
an online service marketplace. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature by 
extending the analysis to a new setting of increasing economic importance. Beyond this 
novel empirical setting, we extend the line of prior work by introducing a set of 
moderating variables and by taking advantage of repeatedly observing the same seller 
over time. 
3.3. Description of the Empirical Setting 
Our data comes from vWorker.com, an on-line intermediary that brings together 
buyers and sellers of software development services and other professional services. The 
company began as rentacoder.com, but later expanded the scope of services beyond 
software. 
At vWorker, registered buyers (firms or individuals) submit projects to the 
intermediary seeking bids from coders. Along with this submission, the buyer provides 
a project specification, lists the required skills for a successful completion of the project, 
and sets a targeted deadline. Registered sellers (coders) read the descriptions of the 
projects. Depending on their relevant expertise and their overall interest in the project, a 
small fraction of coders then submit bids to the intermediary. Bidders can observe the 
current number and characteristics of participants in an auction, but they cannot see the 
competing bids of other coders. At a time pre-determined by the buyer, the intermediary 
ends the auction and presents a catalog of all bids to the buyer. The buyer sees the bids, 
including prices, coder location, coder reputation, and the number of projects the coder 
has completed. With a click on the coder, the buyer can obtain more detailed 
information on the coder, including a picture of the coder as well as a history of the 
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coder’s prior work alongside with comments and reputation scores posted by previous 
buyers.  
 When choosing from the menu, the buyer thus observes all bids and has access 
to all information about the submitting coders. Based on this information, the buyer 
awards the project to one coder. At the moment of choice, the buyer potentially faces 
both adverse selection (are the coders qualified for the job?) as well as moral hazard 
(will the coders keep their promises?). The intermediary provides a set of measures to 
reduce these problems. First, the intermediary keeps a rating (reputation score) for each 
of the participants in the marketplace based on the feedback from historical transactions. 
Second, the intermediary provides an arbitration system to resolve potential disputes 
should the service not meet the buyer’s expectations. When the buyer chooses the coder, 
the buyer submits the funds corresponding to the bid he has chosen to an escrow 
account managed by the intermediary. The money remains in escrow until the service 
has been carried out at the satisfaction of the buyer. 
Upon completion of the work (or after arbitration), the money (or in the case of 
arbitration, a fraction of the money) is transferred to the coder. Finally, the buyer has an 
opportunity to rate the coder, leading to an update in the coder’s reputation score, 
which is computed as the average of the previous ratings received by the coder. The 
buyer can also provide verbal comments (positive or negative) for the coder. 
Turning our attention to the supply side of this market, coders make several 
decisions. First, they decide whether to bid for a project or not. If they decide to bid, they 
decide the amount they want to bid, and if they are awarded the project, they decide the 
level of effort they exert. Furthermore, coders can take tests on the site to certify their 
skills (for example, they can take a C++ exam to become a certified C++ coder). These 
certifications appear in their profiles and can be viewed by buyers. Coders face a 
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dynamic decision problem: they are bidding and working on projects in the near term, 
but they also have to think strategically about the future. Strategic considerations arise 
from the fact that the website keeps track of work done by coders and the resulting 
buyer satisfaction. This makes past coder actions a part of public information in the 
market. And, as discussed above, future buyers will take this information into account 
when they choose among competing bids. Coders can also be influenced by their own 
reputation when setting their bids. Assuming that buyers value coder reputation 
positively and that buyers trade off reputation and price (which is something that we 
hypothesize and test in the next sections), a coder, especially one who is new to this 
marketplace, may bid relatively low in order to accumulate some experience or to build 
reputation. Experienced coders with good reputation scores, in contrast, may bid 
relatively high because they know that buyers appreciate their higher reputation score 
and are willing to pay premium prices for this. 
3.4. Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses Development 
We analyze four effects of coder reputation on market outcomes. First, we study 
how buyers choose among competing bids, focusing on how buyers react to coders’ 
reputation scores. Second, we study how the evolution of coders’ reputation scores 
affects their bids. Third, we study how particular informational situations and 
characteristics of the coders moderate the effect of the reputation score on buyer choice. 
And fourth, we analyze how information unobserved to us as researchers, yet 
potentially public information in the marketplace, complements the structured 
reputation score created by the intermediary.  
In order to develop our hypotheses, we rely mainly on results derived from 
economic models of asymmetric information as they apply to reputation systems. 
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Reputation systems are primarily used to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. In online service marketplaces, moral hazard could occur once a project is 
awarded if the coder engages in post-contractual opportunism by exerting less effort 
than the one required to deliver what was promised. The reputation mechanism can 
reduce moral hazard by offering a sanctioning device (Dellarocas, 2006). As noted by 
Dellarocas (2006), “if the community follows a norm that punishes traders with histories 
of bad behavior (by refusing to buy from them, or by reducing the price they are willing 
to pay for their products) and if the present value of punishment exceeds the gains from 
cheating, then the threat of public revelation of a trader’s cheating behavior in the 
current round provides rational traders with sufficient incentives to cooperate.”  Klein 
and Leffler (1981) develop the notion that repetition can induce trustworthiness and 
contract performance. In our particular case, and focusing on buyer’s actions, if such a 
sanctioning device is in place we would expect buyers to be more likely to award 
projects to coders with histories of good behavior (e.g., to coders with high reputation) 
or to be willing to higher bids to coders with a better reputation.  
Buyers do not have information about the real ability or intentions of the sellers, 
creating an adverse selection problem.  In such a setting, reputation mechanisms can act 
as signaling devices. For example, the fact that a coder has received consistently high 
ratings in a particular type of project may allow the buyer to update his beliefs with 
respect to the skills of the coder. Assuming that commitment to high effort is a “type” 
characteristic (e.g., there are coders who are always exert high effort and coders who 
always exert low effort), the reputation score also gives a signal about the likelihood of 
the coder exerting high effort. Frameworks dealing with reputation as Bayesian 
updating on a hidden type are described in Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kreps et al, 
(1982).  
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Dellarocas (2006) describes the distinction between pure moral hazard and pure 
adverse selection settings in that in the former case, all sellers are assumed to have the 
same ability level and are capable of the same type of behavior, while in the latter case 
they have different intrinsic abilities. In pure moral hazard settings, the reputation 
system is used to constrain behavior, while in pure adverse selection settings the 
reputation system is used to induce learning.  
Our first analysis aims to estimate the effect of coder reputation score on buyer’s 
choice behavior. The two frameworks described above support the hypothesis that 
higher coder reputation should result in a higher perceived utility for the buyer and thus 
a higher probability of the bid being chosen. According to a pure moral hazard model, a 
higher reputation score would induce higher effort by the coder because building 
reputation is costly for the coders, and a coder with a higher reputation is exposed to a 
higher potential sanction for a deviation of the expected behavior, and therefore is more 
likely to cooperate. According to a pure signaling model, a coder with a higher 
reputation score is more likely to have better skills or to be committed to exerting high 
effort in the task. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. The probability of awarding a project to a coder increases with the 
reputation score of the coder. 
Empirical support for this hypothesis would complement prior work in product 
auctions that have established a price premium of product auctions in these settings (see 
Bajari and Hortacsu 2004 for a review). Besides confirming that the direction of the effect 
is the one we hypothesize, we are interested in quantifying the trade-off between price 
and reputation made by buyers in online service marketplaces.  
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The second part of our analysis is concerned with how a coder behaves in this 
market. To the extent that buyers care about reputation (Hypothesis 1), a profit-
maximizing coder will take advantage of this preference. Specifically, a coder who 
achieves a higher reputation can follow one of two strategies. First, the coder can benefit 
from his reputation by increasing the bid amount and keeping the probability of being 
chosen constant. Second, the coder can benefit from his reputation by bidding at the 
same level as before and enjoying a higher probability of winning a given auction. In 
other words, coders can extract the benefits of higher reputation through price or 
through volume. It is an empirical question to find how those two (potentially 
coexisting) mechanisms play out in this market. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a. The bid amounts set by coders increase with their reputation score. 
Hypothesis 2b. The probability of a coder winning a project increases with the 
reputation score of the coder. 
Beyond testing these two hypotheses, we are interested in the magnitude of the 
price adjustment, if such adjustment exists. The comparison between the magnitude of 
the price effect in coder bidding and the reputation-price tradeoff made by the buyer 
allows us to interpret whether the coder extracts the reputation premium mostly 
through price or through volume. These hypotheses also allow us to explore a subtle 
difference between online service marketplaces and product auctions. Consider an eBay 
auction for a good with at least one bidder and no reserve price. If there is a reputation 
premium, we would expect this to be materialized through a higher closing price in the 
auction. Consider now a project in a service marketplace like ours. Higher reputation of 
one bidder does not necessarily result in a higher expected transaction price. The 
reputation premium can be manifested just through an alternative allocation of the 
project, other than the one that would have occurred if the reputation had stayed the 
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same. For example, the higher reputation can just help this coder gain a project that 
would have gone to another coder with lower reputation and same price. If coders do 
not increase their bids with their reputation score (i.e., if Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported), the reputation premium will result in a different allocation of projects but 
not necessarily in higher prices. But if coders increase their bids as they increase their 
reputation (i.e., if Hypothesis 2a is validated), at least some of the reputation premium 
will reach the market in the form of higher transaction prices. 
While the reputation score is an important element to facilitate online 
transactions, the effect of reputation score on buyer choice is not equally important in 
every situation. Our third analysis considers variables that moderate the effect of 
reputation on choice. We develop hypotheses on how the buyer’s utility for reputation 
score interacts with other available informational situations and coder characteristics. 
Our purpose is not to establish an exhaustive list of all the situations that might interact 
with reputation, but to offer some representative examples of moderating variables that 
affect the utility of the reputation score, according to mechanisms that can be explained 
from available theories drawn from signaling models, sanctioning models, and 
behavioral models of trust. In particular, we propose hypotheses regarding how the 
impact of the numerical score on buyer’s choice is moderated by four situations that 
exist in our market but that also have a broader applicability. 
First, consider the role of coder certification. Because the reputation score has a 
signaling function, it is informative to study how its impact changes when there are 
alternative signals available. Our market provides one feature that allows us to explore 
this question: vWorker allows coders to certify their skills by taking a timed skill 
assessment test. For example, coders can take a test to certify their C++ coding skills. The 
certification information is visible to the buyers in the platform, and they might take it 
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into account when awarding projects. This certification works as a signaling device 
(Spence 1973): it is costly to obtain (workers must take a test) and the costs of obtaining 
it are higher for less able coders. We would therefore expect that the buyer’s perceived 
utility increases with the availability of coder certification. How should the availability 
of additional information affect the impact of the reputation score on buyer’s choice? For 
coders who do not have certification, the reputation score is the only available signal. 
Coders who have certified skills have another available signal and therefore in those 
cases the reputation score is a less informative signal overall, and we expect it to have a 
lower impact on buyer’s decisions than when there are no signals other than the 
reputation score. This is formalized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3-1a. The probability of awarding an auction to a coder is higher when a 
coder is certified. 
Hypothesis 3-1b. The reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice probability 
when a coder is certified. 
Second, consider the importance of a prior relationship between buyer and seller. 
From a signaling standpoint, having worked with a coder in the past gives firsthand 
information on the coder’s skills. Analogous to the previous case, we can hypothesize 
that an additional available signal can reduce the informativeness of the reputation 
score. But there are also other important behavioral considerations derived from the 
literature on management of organizations. This literature has studied the aspects that 
influence perceived trustworthiness and that can induce trust in uncertain transactions. 
Familiarity between organizations and individuals has been observed to breed trust 
(Gulati 1995), and therefore we would expect that familiarity with the coder will result 
in higher valuation for the buyer. Furthermore, perceived trustworthiness can also make 
up for a lower reputation score. This is formalized in the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3-2a. The probability of awarding an auction to a coder is higher when the 
buyer has worked with the coder before. 
Hypothesis 3-2b. The reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice probability 
when the buyer has worked with the coder before. 
Third, consider the effect of location on reputation and trust. It has been noted 
that similarity between agents simplifies communication and makes trust generation 
easier (Kossinets and Watts 2009). Therefore, we predict that buyers will prefer coders 
from the same country, all else being equal. An alternative justification for this 
hypothesis is that when the buyer and coder are from the same country, there are 
alternative sanctioning devices. For example, it is easier for the buyer to use the court of 
law if the project is performed poorly and arbitration is not favorable. The availability of 
alternative sanctioning devices reduces the appeal of using threats to the reputation 
score as a sanctioning device, and therefore we would expect the impact of the 
reputation score to be lower when the coder is local. Furthermore, the increased 
perceived trustworthiness of a local coder can make up for a lower reputation score. We 
formalize these notions with the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3-3a. The probability of awarding an auction to a coder is higher when the 
coder is local. 
Hypothesis 3-3b. The reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice probability 
when a coder is local. 
Fourth, the last moderator of reputation that we explore is the availability of a 
coder’s picture. Recent research in psychology has demonstrated that people are more 
willing to punish an agent that they consider mindful (Gray et al., 2007), and it has been 
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suggested that anthropomorphizing agents results in increased trustworthiness (Waytz 
et al., 2010). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3-4a. The probability of awarding an auction to a coder is higher when the 
coder has a picture. 
Hypothesis 3-4b. The reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice probability 
when a coder has a picture. 
3.5. Data 
Our dataset includes the 273,837 projects that were posted in vWorker between 
May 2001 and November 2010. We observe a total of 1,822,705 bids. This amounts to an 
average of 6.66 bids per project. Most of our data corresponds to the period in which 
vWorker was called rentacoder.com and the projects are primarily concerned with 
software development services. The projects are typically small. The mean winning bid 
is $126.50 (median winning bid is $50). Most of the bids (94.5%) are below $500. 
For each project, we compute the number of bids received, the winning bid, and 
the highest, lowest, mean and median bid. Besides that, we know the date when the bid 
request was posted, and the rating given to the coder. Table 3.1 shows some summary 
statistics at the project, bid and coder level. 
The participation of the bidders in the market is very heterogeneous. More than 
half of the coders submitted 3 or less bids. Many of the coders did not win any auction. 
Actually, only 29,786 of the 122,102 coders (24%) won at least one project during the ten 
years of our sample. Some features of this market are consistent with the Pareto 
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property: a large number of users are mostly inactive and a small number of users 
generate a large fraction of the transactions on the site.  
3.6. Econometric Specification and Results 
3.6.1 Econometric Model of Buyer Choice 
The multi-attribute procurement auction can be modeled using a conditional 
logit specification (McFadden 1974). We assume that the utility that a generic buyer 
obtains from accepting a bid b submitted for project i can be expressed as 
   
     
       (3.1)
 
where Xib are the attributes of the bids that affect the utility that the buyer 
receives from choosing that bid. Let C(b) denote the coder that submits the bid b, B(i) 
denote the buyer that submits the project i, S(i) denote the set of bids received for project 
i and D(b) denote the date when the bid b is submitted. These attributes can be broken 
down into the subvectors  Xib=(Xproject|Xbid|Xcoder|Xrelation|Xbid-set)  using the following 
simplified notation: 
 Xproject are attributes that depend only on the project and are constant for 
all bids received for the project, such as the number of bids received for 
the project.  
 Xbid are attributes that depend only on the bid, such as the bid amount.  
 Xcoder are attributes that depend on the coder, such as the coder’s country 
of origin, and potentially on the time D(b) when the bid is submitted, 
such as the reputation score of the coder at that time. 
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 Xrelation are attributes that depend on the relationship between a given 
coder and a given buyer, and potentially on the time D(b) when the bid is 
submitted. Examples are an indicator of whether the coder and buyer are 
from the same country or an indicator of whether the buyer has worked 
with the coder before at the time of bid submission 
 Xbid-set are attributes that depend on the bid and on the other set of bids S(i) 
received for the project. One example of this type of variable is whether a 
bid is the smallest one received for a project. 
We do not observe the utility that the buyer obtains from choosing a bid but we 
do observe which bid b=1..J the buyer chooses, if any. Let Yi=b if bid b is chosen by buyer 
for project i, which implies uib>uik for all k≠b. If the error ib follows a Gumbel (type 1 
extreme value) distribution, the probability of choosing a bid has a closed form: 
  (    )  
    
  
∑     
   
   
 
(3.2)
 
Note that the coefficients that correspond to the variables included in Xproject (i.e., 
variables that remain constant for all the bids received for a project) cannot be identified 
from this model, since the conditional logit model requires variation across alternatives. 
3.6.2 Reputation and Bid Choice 
We start by analyzing how buyers use the available information in their bid 
choice decision. In particular, we are interested in the effect of reputation on the 
probability of a bid being chosen. We start with a parsimonious model that allows us to 
quantify the effect of coder reputation on buyer’s choices. 
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In the bid-specific set of variables Xbid we would include the amount of the bid. 
However, since there is a huge heterogeneity between projects and within bids in a 
project, we normalize the amount of the bids with respect to the rest of the bids received 
for the project as:  
            
           
    
 (3.3)
 
where set=S(i) is the set of bids received for project i,      denotes the median bid 
received for the bid request i and      denotes the standard deviation of the bids 
submitted to the bid request. In other words, we express bid amounts as the distance to 
the median bid received for the project, measured in number of standard deviations of 
the bids received for the project. We have tested alternative specifications for the 
normalization procedure, and the qualitative results do not change. We also include a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the submitted bid is the smallest, so that we can 
capture any additional premium that the buyer attributes to the cheapest offer. 
Therefore Xbid-set  contains two variables, BIDNbid-set and SMALLESTbid-set. 
Among the coder-specific variables Xcoder, we include the number of ratings that 
the coder has received in the past, the reputation score of the coder when the bid is 
awarded and a dummy variable to control for those cases in which the coder has 
received no ratings in the past. We also include region dummies (one for US/Canada, 
one for Eastern Europe, one for rest of Europe, one for India/Pakistan, one for rest of 
Asia and one for other location). Therefore Xcoder contains the variables NRATINGScoder-time, 
REPUTSCOREcoder-time, UNRATEDcoder-time, and the regional dummies. 
Finally, in this specification Xrelation includes a dummy variable that indicates 
whether coder and buyer are from the same country.  
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We estimate the model using maximum likelihood. Table 3.2 shows the estimates 
(column 1) and the marginal effects evaluated in the median values of the variables 
(column 2).  
We observe that the probability of choosing a bid decreases with the 
(normalized) bid amount, as we would expect from a buyer who has a positive utility 
for money. The probability of choosing a bid increases with the number of ratings that 
the coder has received, which is a proxy for experience.  
The smallest bid received in a bid request, and the bids received from coders 
who are from the same country as the buyer, have a higher probability of being selected. 
Coders from U.S or Canada (the baseline category) are preferred, all else being equal, 
although there is no statistical difference with the coders from Western Europe. Coders 
from India, Pakistan, and the rest of Asia are less preferred. 
The positive and significant coefficient for the reputation score allows us to 
validate Hypothesis 1: the probability of awarding an auction to a coder does increase 
with the reputation score of the coder. These results are consistent with both the 
signaling and the sanctioning role of reputation mechanisms. A buyer may prefer to 
work with a coder with higher reputation because this updates his beliefs on the skills of 
the worker (adverse selection story) or because he thinks that the coder will have more 
to lose if he does not perform well, because of the higher cost of a sanction for a coder 
with higher reputation (moral hazard story). 
Besides looking at the signs of the coefficients, it is interesting to analyze the 
comparative magnitude of their marginal effects, in particular the one of the reputation 
score. At the median values, one additional reputation point increases the probability of 
choosing a bid by 0.0054. This is approximately the same effect on success probability as 
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reducing the normalized bid value by one standard deviation. This implies that the 
reputational effects in this market are economically very important.  
We propose a more detailed model in Section 6.4, where we discuss the 
interactions of the reputation score with other variables, and we observe that the effects 
that we identify with this parsimonious model do not qualitatively change. 
3.6.3 Reputation and Bidding Behavior 
Having established the effect of reputation on bid choice by the buyer, we now 
turn our attention to how coders adjust their bidding behavior over time as their 
reputation varies. Our dataset is unique in that respect, because we can follow coders 
over time.  
If coders are aware of the fact that buyers are willing to pay a significant 
premium for bids coming from coders with high reputation, they may increase their 
relative bids as they obtain more reputation. We propose the following specification to 
estimate the magnitude of the effect: 
                                            (3.4)
 
where j denotes the coder C(b) and t denotes D(b), the time at which bid b is 
placed. The variables have been previously introduced. We include coder fixed-effects to 
control for time-invariant characteristics of the coder.  
If   >0 and significant, then our Hypothesis 2a (the bid amounts set by coders 
increase with their reputation score) is validated. If   <0 or if it is not significantly 
different from 0, our Hypothesis 2a is rejected. The expected effect of            on 
price is ambiguous: on one hand, the more projects a coder has won in the past, the 
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more knowledgeable he/she is expected to be. This is valued by the buyer and therefore 
coders with more previous ratings will be able to charge more while maintaining the 
probability of being chosen. On the other hand, experience can also reduce cost. If coders 
who have been awarded projects in the past have lower costs, they could charge lower 
prices while keeping their expected revenue constant. 
We estimate the coefficients by using a fixed-effects estimator (Least Squares 
Dummy Variable). Table 3.3 shows the estimates.  
Column 1 shows the results for the coefficients of the reputation score and the 
number of ratings. The results show that the bid amount does indeed increase with 
reputation, and therefore Hypothesis 2a is validated. However, we note that the impact 
of reputation on bid size for a given coder is significantly smaller than the premium that 
the buyers are willing to pay for additional reputation. For an additional reputation 
point, coders increase their bids by 1% of the standard deviation.  This suggests that 
coders could more aggressively try to appropriate the price premium that buyers seem 
to be willing to pay, which can be quantified as close to one standard deviation of the 
bids received for a project. In other words, coders receive most of the benefits of their 
additional reputation by an increase of the probability of being chosen, as opposed to 
through higher prices. Coders do not cash their reputation mainly through price but 
through volume. However, there is a slight effect on prices, which means that at least 
some of the reputation premium will reach the market in the form of higher transaction 
prices.  
Each additional rating also has the effect of increasing the bid slightly. This 
suggests that the demand-side benefits of an additional rating outweigh the potential 
cost reduction that could be passed to the bids, and the net effect is positive. One 
additional rating has a much lower impact than one additional reputation point, but it is 
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important to note that the range that the number of ratings can span is not limited to 10. 
Therefore, for very active coders, this can result in a significant price increase.  
Column 2 adds a dummy variable to control for situations in which the coder has 
no previous ratings, but this variable is not significant and adding it does not change the 
other coefficients. 
Hypothesis 2b (the probability of a coder winning a project increases with the 
reputation score of the coder) is tested using a linear probability model with the 
following specification: 
                                                        
                            (3.5)
 
where    =1 if the bid b submitted by coder j=C(b) for project i is accepted, and 0 
otherwise. Hypothesis 2b is supported if    >0. This model can be estimated with a fixed 
effects regression. The results of the estimation, shown in Table 3.4, give support for 
Hypothesis 2b. In other words, coder yield increases with reputation. Note also that 
these results give only a conservative estimate of the increase in volume that arises from 
higher reputation, since coders also submit more bids as they become more reputable. 
3.6.4 Moderators of the Effect of Reputation Score on Bid Choice 
The model estimated in section 6.1 was a parsimonious model that included only 
the main effects of the variables that were considered a priori more important. We now 
develop a richer model that includes additional variables and their interactions with the 
reputation score. By doing that, we can test the set of Hypotheses 3-1a, 3-1b, 3-2a, 3-2b, 
3-3a, 3-3b, 3-4a, 3-4b that we have developed regarding the impact of certification, 
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familiarity, similarity and anthropomorphism in the probability of awarding bids and 
their moderating effect on the reputation score.  
The main variables that we use in the different specifications are described in 
Table 3.5. We also use interactions between REPUTSCORE and FAMILIARITY, 
HASCERTS, HASPIC and LOCAL. 
Table 3.6 shows the results. The first column reproduces the results of Table 3.4 
for comparison purposes. Column 2 adds variables to the baseline specification: 
HASCERTS is a variable that indicates whether a coder has certified his skills taking an 
online test; HASPIC is a variable that indicates whether the coder has included a picture 
in his profile; FAMILIARITY is a variable that indicates whether the buyer has worked 
with the coder before. Adding these variables improves the fit of the models but does 
not significantly change the coefficients obtained with the parsimonious analysis 
presented in section 6.2. Columns 3-6 incorporate the interactions between 
REPUTSCORE and HASCERTS, LOCAL, HASPIC and FAMILIARITY, respectively, and 
column 7 presents the full model with all the interactions. All the columns include 
controls for coder region and an indicator of whether the coder has not been rated yet. 
The coefficient of the variable HASCERTS is positive and significant in all the 
specifications that include it (columns 2-7). This implies that the probability of awarding 
an auction to a coder is higher when the coder is certified, validating Hypothesis 3-1a. 
Furthermore, the interaction between HASCERTS and REPUTSCORE is negative and 
significant. This implies that the reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice 
probability when the coder is certified, which validates Hypothesis 3-1b. In other words, 
reputation and certification work as substitutes. 
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The coefficient of the FAMILIARITY variable (which indicates whether buyer 
and coder have worked together before) is positive and significant in all the 
specifications that include it (columns 2-7). This implies that the probability of awarding 
an auction to a coder is higher when the buyer has worked with the coder before, which 
validates Hypothesis 3-2a. Furthermore, the interaction between FAMILIARITY and 
REPUTSCORE is negative and significant. This implies that the reputation score has a 
lower impact on buyer’s choice probability when the buyer has worked with the coder 
before, which validates Hypothesis 3-2b. Reputation and familiarity with the coder work 
as substitutes. 
The coefficient of the LOCAL variable is positive and significant in all the 
specifications that include it (columns 1-7). This implies that the probability of awarding 
an auction to a coder is higher when the coder is local, validating Hypothesis 3-3a. 
Furthermore, the interaction between LOCAL and REPUTSCORE is negative and 
significant. This implies that the reputation score has a lower impact on buyer’s choice 
probability when the coder is local. This validates Hypothesis 3-3b and suggests that 
reputation and similarity with the coder work as substitutes. 
Finally, the coefficient of the variable HASPIC is positive and significant in all 
the specifications that include it (columns 2-7). This implies that the probability of 
awarding an auction to a coder is higher when the coder has a picture on the site, 
validating Hypothesis 3-4a. Furthermore, the interaction between HASPIC and 
REPUTSCORE is negative and significant. This implies that the reputation score has a 
lower impact on buyer’s choice probability when the coder has a picture. This validates 
Hypothesis 3-4b and suggests that reputation and the interpersonal trust enabled by 
anthropomorphism work as substitutes. 
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We note that the direction and magnitude of the coefficients of the parsimonious 
model presented in Section 6.2 do not qualitatively change when we add more variables, 
suggesting that the parsimonious model is not subject to significant omitted variable 
bias. 
3.7. Conclusions and Future Work 
Our results allow us to draw important conclusions regarding the effect of 
reputation on market outcomes in online service marketplaces.  We find that buyers 
react to coder reputation and are willing to pay a significant premium to award a project 
to a more reputable bidder. On a representative bid, one additional point in the 
reputation score has the same effect on the probability of being chosen as a reduction of 
the bid amount of one standard deviation of the bids posted for that project.  
Sellers also take into account their reputation when submitting their bids, and 
they adjust their bidding strategy as they accumulate reputation. However, they 
increase their prices more conservatively than what it seems that buyers would be 
willing to support. This can be interpreted as coders reaping most of the benefits of their 
reputation through higher volumes, rather than through higher prices. 
The reputation score does not live in a vacuum, and buyers do not react to 
reputation in an absolute way. The context of the transaction is important to 
determining the impact that reputation will have on choices. We have shown that coder 
certification reduces the value of reputation, and the same happens with situations that 
prompt interpersonal trustworthiness, such as familiarity between buyer and coder, 
common origin of buyer and coder, and coder anthropomorphism. The reputation score 
happens to be more meaningful in situations where there is no information about the 
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coder, there are limited external sanctioning mechanisms, or in situations where 
interpersonal trustworthiness is less likely to arise. These results have a broader 
applicability beyond the setting we study, and suggest that reputation and third-party 
certification can operate as substitutes. The same phenomenon is observed between 
interpersonal trust and reputation.  
The reputation system is not the only mechanism in place to control moral 
hazard in online service marketplaces. Most of the online service marketplaces, 
including vWorker.com, use an escrow system that only releases the funds after the 
work has been approved. In contrast to a pre-payment scheme, an escrow scheme 
reduces the likelihood that the coder would want to engage in post-contractual 
opportunism, because the buyer can threaten not releasing the funds if the coder fails to 
perform to the specifications of the work. Similarly, the reputation system is not the only 
mechanism in place to signal quality. Increasingly, platforms like vWorker offer coders 
the possibility of certifying their skills. Our results on the interplay of reputation score, 
third-party certification and interpersonal trust are relevant for the design of 
mechanisms that combine a reputation score with other features to reduce transaction 
risk. 
We conclude by discussing some limitations and areas of ongoing and future 
work. Our results presented here are based on a descriptive analysis in a reduced form 
setting. On the buyer side, one limitation of our approach is that we have not considered 
buyer heterogeneity. Our analysis can be interpreted as revealing the preferences of a 
representative buyer in this marketplace. We have experimented with random 
coefficient models that allow for some heterogeneity and our qualitative results do not 
seem to change, but we believe that fully accounting for buyer heterogeneity could 
result in additional insights. On the coder side, our model of bid setting estimates the 
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average effect of reputation and number of previous ratings on bid prices. However, 
there can be important non-linearities. These non-linearities, and more broadly the 
complex dynamics of coder behavior, could be better captured by using a structural 
model that endogeneizes the coder’s decision to bid for a given project. Such model 
could also explicitly incorporate forward-looking considerations about pricing and 
reputation accumulation. There is very little previous work in this space. To our 
knowledge, only Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 
(2003) have modeled repeated participation in auctions, which requires the use of 
dynamic models. By developing such a structural model, we would be able to run 
counterfactual simulations to understand how the reputation system affects the market 
outcomes over time.  
Besides incorporating complementary methodologies, there are other questions 
related to the design of reputation systems for online service marketplaces that could be 
addressed in future related work. For example, understanding the effect of the amount 
of information that is shown to participants in the marketplace could lead to managerial 
insights regarding the design of better reputation systems. If buyers only see a 
reputation score and number of ratings, then coders can quickly obtain reputation points 
by bidding for and winning cheap projects and then using the accumulated reputation 
to obtain better prices in more expensive projects. In order to account for that, vWorker 
now shows the total dollar amount that has been awarded to a coder to date. Given that 
some of the online service marketplaces have existed for a few years now, there have 
been several policy changes like this one. Research on these policy changes could reveal 
the effect of some decisions in the market outcomes.  
With the increasing economic importance of online marketplaces, we believe that 
these and other related questions will receive more attention in the future.  
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3.9. Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Project Variables 
DESCRIPTION mean sd MED min max count 
Project-level summary statistics       
 Minimum bid in the bid request 97.83 259.95 30 1 17000 273837 
 Maximum bid in the bid request 1247.68 230800.8 71.25 1 9.00E+07 273837 
 Amount of the winning bid 126.53 349.97 50 1 30000 273837 
 Mean bid 227.47 18413.25 50 1 8333460 273837 
 Median bid 141.47 1953.34 50 1 1000000 273837 
 Standard deviation of bids 611.76 83294.5 25.57 0 2.36e+07 139750 
 Number of bids in bid request 6.67 10.74 2 1 248 273837 
 Rating to coder 9.78 0.78 10 0 10 128888 
Bid-level summary statistics       
 Bid amount 192.66 1430.35 70 1 1000000 1822705 
 Average coder rating 9.34 1.21 9.78 0 10 1256105 
 Minimum coder rating 6.23 3.73 8 0 10 1256105 
 Number of previously won  projects  33.68 84.40 6 0 1870 1812695 
 Number of ratings 23.81 62.67 4 0 1697 1812695 
Coder-level summary statistics       
 # of bids submitted by a coder 14.93 60.77 3 1 2795 122102 
 # of projects won by a coder 2.25 11.98 0 0 795 122102 
 # of bid requests posted by buyer  6.11 18.51 2 1 2075 45666 
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Table 3.2: Bid Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(1) (2) 
 
 
 VARIABLES SUCCESS MFX 
      
BIDNN -0.457*** -0.00508*** 
 
(0.00486) (0.000262) 
NRATINGS 0.00278*** 3.10e-05*** 
 
(4.95e-05) (1.65e-06) 
REPUTSCORE 0.487*** 0.00543*** 
 
(0.00563) (0.000211) 
UNRATED 3.439*** 0.0109*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.000536) 
SMALLEST 0.185*** 0.00189*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.000134) 
LOCAL 0.362*** 0.00339*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.000204) 
EASTERN_EUROPE -0.100*** -0.00117*** 
 
(0.0131) (0.000171) 
INDIA_PAK -0.532*** -0.00776*** 
 
(0.0126) (0.000467) 
OTHER_ASIA -0.390*** -0.00528*** 
 
(0.0152) (0.000367) 
OTHER_EUROPE -0.0104 -0.000116 
 
(0.0149) (0.000168) 
OTHER_LOCATION -0.238*** -0.00298*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.000284) 
   Observations 1,595,257 1,595,257 
Pseudo R2 0.119 
 LL -243323  
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Table 3.3: Bid Setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  (1) (2) 
 
  
VARIABLES BIDN BIDN 
      
REPUTSCORE 0.0102*** 0.0112*** 
 
(0.000153) (0.000676) 
UNRATED 
 
0.00941 
  
(0.00635) 
NRATINGS 0.000868*** 0.000868*** 
 
(1.47e-05) (1.47e-05) 
Constant -0.0164*** -0.0256*** 
 
(0.00109) (0.00631) 
   Observations 1,799,520 1,799,520 
R-squared 0.246 0.246 
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Table 3.4: Coder Yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
(1) 
VARIABLES Coder Yield 
    
BIDNN -0.00881*** 
 
(0.000353) 
SMALLEST 0.301*** 
 
(0.000802) 
LOCAL 0.0322*** 
 
(0.00126) 
REPUTSCORE 0.0113*** 
 
(0.000267) 
NRATINGS 0.000370*** 
 
(8.41e-06) 
UNRATED 0.0546*** 
 
(0.00234) 
NBIDS -0.00308*** 
 
(1.12e-05) 
Constant 0.0536*** 
 
(0.00245) 
  Observations 1,799,520 
R-squared 0.372 
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Table 3.5: Main Variables Used in the Analysis 
 Variable Description Belongs to set… 
NBIDS Number of bids submitted to the project Xproject 
BIDNN Normalized bid amount Xbid-set 
SMALLEST Indicates that the bid is the smallest received for a project Xbid-set 
NRATINGS Number of ratings received by the coder Xcoder   
REPUTSCORE Average rating received by coder in previous projects Xcoder 
UNRATED Indicates that the coder has not received previous ratings Xcoder 
HASCERTS Indicates whether a coder has been certified on the site Xcoder 
HASPIC Indicates whether the coder has a picture on the site Xcoder 
FAMILIARITY Indicates whether buyer and coder have worked together before Xrelation 
LOCAL Indicates that buyer and coder are from the same country Xrelation 
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Table 3.6: Moderators of Reputation (2001-2010). 
 
 
 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
VARIABLES        
                
BIDNN -0.457*** -0.457*** -0.456*** -0.457*** -0.456*** -0.456*** -0.456*** 
 
(0.00486) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00495) (0.00495) 
NRATINGS 0.00278*** 0.00220*** 0.00222*** 0.00220*** 0.00221*** 0.00221*** 0.00223*** 
 
(4.95e-05) (4.99e-05) (5.00e-05) (4.98e-05) (4.99e-05) (4.99e-05) (4.99e-05) 
REPUTSCORE 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.490*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.491*** 0.503*** 
 
(0.00563) (0.00588) (0.00591) (0.00591) (0.00594) (0.00591) (0.00601) 
HASCERTS 
 
0.154*** 0.439*** 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.424*** 
  
(0.0140) (0.0505) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0509) 
HASPIC 
 
0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.220*** 0.125*** 0.222*** 
  
(0.00687) (0.00687) (0.00687) (0.0158) (0.00687) (0.0159) 
FAMILIARITY 
 
1.308*** 1.308*** 1.308*** 1.308*** 1.428*** 1.430*** 
  
(0.00876) (0.00876) (0.00876) (0.00876) (0.0201) (0.0202) 
LOCAL 0.362*** 0.362*** 0.363*** 0.573*** 0.363*** 0.362*** 0.578*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0228) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0229) 
SMALLEST 0.185*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
REPUT_HAS_CERTS 
  
-0.0314*** 
   
-0.0295*** 
   
(0.00539) 
   
(0.00543) 
REPUT_LOCAL 
   
-0.0289*** 
  
-0.0295*** 
    
(0.00242) 
  
(0.00243) 
REPUT_PIC 
    
-0.0120*** 
 
-0.0122*** 
     
(0.00181) 
 
(0.00182) 
REPUT_FAM 
     
-0.0150*** -0.0153*** 
      
(0.00226) (0.00227) 
  
Observations 1,595,257 1,595,257 1,595,257 1,595,257 1,595,257 1,595,257 1,595,257 
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 
LL -243323 -231115 -231099 -231045 -231094 -231092 -230982 
df 11 14 15 15 15 15 18 
AIC 486668.8 462258.6 462227.6 462120 462217.3 462213.3 462000.4 
BIC 486803.9 462430.6 462411.9 462304.3 462401.5 462397.6 462221.5 
% suc predicted 0.338256 0.386362 0.386301 0.386955 0.386355 0.38667 0.386939 
% fail predicted 0.938365 0.94203 0.942026 0.942112 0.942004 0.941928 0.942 
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Chapter 4 
The Effects of Product Line Breadth 
Abstract 
 
Using a detailed dataset from the U.S. automotive industry in 2002-2009, we 
study the effects of product line breadth on market shares and costs. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, we find a positive association between product line breadth and 
market share (0.1% per additional product) and unit production costs ($175 per 
additional product). Average unit production costs decrease with the use of platform 
families (on average, for every 100,000 vehicles produced for other models based on the 
same platform, unit production costs are reduced by $55). Besides production costs, we 
study the effect of product line breadth on mismatch costs arising from demand 
uncertainty, manifested through discounts and additional inventories. An additional 
product in the line is associated with an increase of around $100 in average discounts 
and with carrying three additional days of supply in the average inventory of all the 
models of the line. We propose an additional measure of product line breadth based on 
the range of fuel economy levels offered by an automaker. We find that automakers who 
offer a broader range of fuel economy levels increase their market share and reduce their 
average discounts as gas prices increase, suggesting that product line breadth can work 
as a hedge against changes in demand conditions. 
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4.1.  Introduction 
Product proliferation is pervasive in many industries. Consumers willing to buy 
a car in 2002 in the United States could choose among some 192 models, each of which 
had multiple configuration options. Certainly, that is a broader choice set than the black 
Ford T available to consumers in 1908, but not very impressive if we compare it with the 
234 models that were available in 2007, only five years later. On average, individual 
automakers have been broadening their products lines over the last few years. This 
paper studies the effects of product line breadth in the U.S. automotive industry. 
Previous theoretical and empirical literature has been concerned with the drivers 
and effects of product line breadth. Theoretical models (e.g., Lancaster 1990) suggest that 
broader product lines should result in higher firm market share, since customers are 
more likely to find products that are closer to their taste, and in higher production costs, 
due to the loss of economies of scale. However, as noted by Netessine and Taylor (2007), 
“empirical researchers have analyzed linkages between variety and production costs, 
but have arrived at contradicting conclusions.” For example, Kekre and Srinavasan 
(1990) find that broader product lines are associated with lower production and 
inventory costs, while Bayus and Putsis (1999) find a positive association between 
product line breadth and production costs.  
Besides this lack of consensus in the empirical findings, the empirical literature 
on the effects of product line breadth presents some opportunities for new work. Some 
important notions developed in the operations management and product development 
communities have been largely ignored by the empirical literature that studies the effect 
of product line breadth on costs. For example, Fisher (1997) discusses the two types of 
functions performed by supply chains: a physical function and a market mediation 
function, each of which incur in a different type of cost. Physical costs are the costs of 
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production, transportation and inventory storage, while market mediation costs arise 
“when supply exceeds demand and a product has to be marked down and sold at a loss 
or when supply falls short of demand, resulting in lost sales opportunities and 
dissatisfied customers”(Fisher, 1997). The literature on product line breadth has focused 
on the first type of cost, but has not considered the second type, which we generically 
label as mismatch costs. Mismatch costs are largely a consequence of demand 
uncertainty. Other notions such as delayed differentiation (Swaminathan and Tayur 
1998) or component commonality and product platforms (Robertson and Ulrich 1998) 
have been theoretically shown to allow offering a broad product line while controlling 
production and development costs. However, to the best of our knowledge, the effects of 
component sharing and platform strategies on production costs have not been 
empirically studied.  
In this paper, we attempt to bridge the gap between these theoretical notions that 
have been developed in the operations management and product development 
communities and the existing empirical literature on the effects of product line breadth. 
In order to do that, we use a detailed dataset of the U.S. automotive industry during the 
period 2002-2009. Besides being a very important industry, the automotive industry 
provides a very suitable setting to study the effects of product line breadth and, in 
particular, some of the aforementioned issues. It is an industry in which product 
platforms are used extensively, and it has a very particular pricing structure (firms set 
list prices before demand is realized and offer discounts when demand is realized) that 
allows us to measure supply-demand mismatch costs separately from production costs. 
In addition to this, firm entry and exit is not very important (at least in the period of 
study) and models are typically marketed over several years, which allows us to observe 
the same models in different contexts of product line breadth.  
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Using a rich dataset of the U.S. automotive industry and drawing from the 
results of some previous empirical and analytical research, we make the following main 
contributions: 
First, we study the effect of product line breadth on market share, and find that a 
broader product line is associated with a higher market share. Carrying one additional 
product in the line is associated with an increase of 0.1% in the market share of an 
automaker. This is consistent with findings of previous empirical papers in other 
settings (e.g., Kekre and Srinivasan 1990, Bayus and Putsis 1999). Using a consumer 
demand model, we also find that customers experience higher utility when product lines 
are broader. These findings illustrate the main benefit of having a broader product line. 
Second, we study the effect of product line breadth on production costs, and find 
that a broader product line is associated with higher average production costs, in 
contrast to Kekre and Srinivasan (1990). One additional product is associated with an 
increase of around $175 on the average unit production cost. These results are 
directionally consistent with the results of Bayus and Putsis (1999). An important 
difference is that Bayus and Putsis (1999) proxy production costs with prices. In the case 
of the automotive industry, different products might have different markups, and this 
approach could lead to bias. In contrast, we assume that the observed prices are the 
result of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, and use a consumer demand model 
to recover the markup of each model, which allows us to estimate the production costs.  
Third, we study the effect of platform families on production costs. We find that, 
consistent with the theoretical literature on platforms, using platform families decreases 
the production costs. On average, for every 100,000 vehicles produced for other models 
based on the same platform, unit production costs are reduced by $55. To our 
knowledge, no previous work has empirically examined the effects of platform families 
on production costs.  
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Fourth, we study the effect of product line breadth on mismatch costs. Mismatch 
costs are a consequence of demand uncertainty. Broader product lines are subject to 
higher demand fragmentation and, following an inverse pooling argument, are more 
exposed to the consequences of demand uncertainty. In the automotive industry, we 
observe mismatch costs in the form of discounts and inventories. We find that an 
additional product in the line is associated with an increase of around $100 in average 
discounts and with carrying three additional days of supply in their average model 
inventories. 
Finally, we propose a complementary attribute-based measure of product line 
breadth, capturing the range of fuel economy levels offered by an automaker, and we 
study how breadth in this measure helps hedge against changes in demand. We find 
that, for the same median fuel economy, automakers who offer a broader range of fuel 
economy levels increase their market share and reduce their average discounts as gas 
prices increase. This suggests that choosing the right type of product breadth can offer a 
hedge against changes in demand arising, in this case, from changes in gas prices.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the underlying theoretical models and develops the main 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in this study. Section 5 
presents the econometric specification and the results of the estimation of the models. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes by discussing some limitations of our study and some 
implications of our findings. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Previous work in the operations management and marketing communities has 
studied product line strategies and their effects on revenues and costs, both empirically 
and theoretically. Among the empirical papers, one of the first papers to study product 
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line breadth was Kekre and Srinivasan (1990). They use self-reported survey data across 
industries to study the market benefits and cost disadvantages of broader product lines. 
They find that broader product lines are associated with higher market shares, but they 
do not find a positive association between broader product lines and production costs. 
In contrast, Bayus and Putsis (1999) analyze the personal computer industry and find an 
association between product line breadth and market shares and prices, which they 
assume to proxy for production costs. In the same industry, Putsis and Bayus (2001) 
study the determinants of product line decisions and suggest that firms expand their 
product lines when there are low industry barriers or when there are perceived market 
opportunities.3 The first contribution of our work to the literature is to revisit the linkage 
between variety and market share and production cost in the context of U.S. automotive 
manufacturers. We find a positive association between product line breadth and both 
market shares and production costs.  
The operations management community has studied the challenges associated 
with managing product variety. Ramdas (2003) provides a review of this literature. 
Some empirical work has studied the effects of product variety in automotive plants. For 
example, Fisher and Ittner (1999) and MacDuffie et al. (1996) analyze the effect of 
product variety on work-in-process inventory, productivity and customer-perceived 
quality. Both papers deal with the effects of variety at the plant level. Our work is 
complementary to those papers, because we study the effects of product line breadth on 
market share and on production and mismatch costs.  
Some work has looked at product line strategies and their relationship with 
supply chain and product development decisions. Randall and Ulrich (2001) consider 
two types of variety: production-dominant variety and mediation-dominant variety (in 
                                                     
3
 Other papers have studied the competitive dimensions of product line length (Draganska and 
Jain, 2005), but these competitive aspects are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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the spirit of market mediation costs described in Fisher 1997); the former is associated 
with higher production costs (such as direct materials, labor, manufacturing overhead, 
and process technology investments) and the latter is associated with higher market 
mediation costs, such as inventory holding costs, product mark-down costs occurring 
when supply exceeds demand, and the costs of lost sales when demand exceeds supply. 
They study the association between these types of variety and certain characteristics of a 
supply chain, such as the production volume and the location of production. They find 
an association between scale-efﬁcient production and production-dominant variety, and 
between local production and mediation-dominant variety. Our work is related to their 
paper, in the sense that we study the empirical relationship between product line 
strategies and what Randall and Ulrich call market mediation costs, which we label as 
mismatch costs. To our knowledge, no previous work has empirically studied the effects 
of product line breadth on mismatch costs. In a related paper, Randall et al. (1998) study 
how the presence of premium products in a product line enhances brand equity, 
analyzing the U.S. mountain bicycle industry. Their analysis supports the hypothesis 
that firms with high-quality products in their lines have higher brand premiums. In 
other words, they find spillovers from the highest-quality models in the product line. 
Like them, we also study product line attributes that go beyond the mere number of 
products in the product line. In our case, we study how the range of fuel economy levels 
offered by a firm’s product line affects the firm’s ability to cope with uncertain demand.  
Our work also builds on the literature on component sharing and product 
platforms. Automotive manufacturers use product platforms to share intellectual and 
material assets across a family of products (Robertson and Ulrich 1998, Krishnan and 
Gupta 2001). Fisher et al. (1999) study the drivers of component sharing. In our work, we 
measure the effects of platform affiliation on average production costs.  
Some theoretical papers that have studied product line strategies provide context 
to our work and to the hypotheses that we test with our data. For example, 
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Swaminathan and Tayur (1998) study delayed differentiation, Van Mieghem and Dada 
(1999) study production postponement, Desai et al. (2001) study the trade-off between 
component commonality and product differentiation, Hopp and Xu (2005) study the 
impact of design modularity on the optimal length and price of a differentiated product 
line, and Netessine and Taylor (2007) study the impact of production technology on the 
optimal product line design. 
A few empirical papers in operations management have studied other aspects of 
the automobile industry that are related to our work. Cachon and Olivares (2010) study 
the drivers of finished-goods inventory in the U.S. automobile industry. Among other 
results, they find that the option content of a model is associated to the inventory of the 
model. Cachon, Gallino and Olivares (2012) study how inventory affects demand, and 
they consider the role of the number of options of a given model. Unlike these two 
papers, our approach to variety is based on the number of products in the product line 
of an automaker, as opposed to number of options within a model. Moreno and 
Terwiesch (2011) study the effect of production flexibility on discounts. In this paper, we 
consider the effect of another strategic decision -- product line breath -- on mismatch 
costs. 
Finally, the unprecedented increase in gas prices has generated a renewed 
interest in the effects of gas prices on market outcomes in the automotive industry. Our 
work is particularly related to two papers in this stream. Busse et al. (2011) study the 
effect of gas prices on prices and market shares of new and old vehicles. Langer and 
Miller (2012) study how gas prices affect automakers’ short-run responses. Our work 
shows how the range of fuel economy levels covered by a firm’s product line affects the 
ability of firms to cope with uncertain demand, and how manufacturers’ reactions to 
changing gas prices depend on attributes of their entire product line. 
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4.3. Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses Development 
We build on existing theory to develop the hypotheses that we test with our 
data. In order to relate our work to earlier studies of product line breadth, we use a 
measure of product line breadth that is consistent with previous work (e.g., Bayus and 
Putsis 1999). We define product line breadth as the number of different products 
(vehicle models, in our empirical setting) that a firm (an automaker, in our empirical 
setting) offers at a given time. We start our analysis by developing two hypotheses that 
have been tested in the literature, dealing with the effect of product line breadth on 
market shares and the effect of product line breadth on production costs.  
The view that product variety brings increases in market share is generally 
accepted and described in marketing textbooks (Kotler and Keller, 2011). Consumers 
have heterogeneous preferences and, using a spatial analogy where products are 
represented in a space where each dimension corresponds to a product attribute, the 
broader the product line, the more likely consumers are to find products that are close to 
their individual preferences. As firms broaden their product line, they increase their 
relative appeal versus their competition. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis H1. An increase in product line breadth is associated with an increase in 
market share 
This hypothesis has received support in the previous empirical literature (Kekre 
and Srinavasan 1990, Bayus and Putsis 1999). Beyond just validating that the effect goes 
in the same direction in the automotive industry, we are interested in quantifying the 
magnitude of the increase in market share. 
Product variety comes at a cost. As noted by Lancaster (1990), greater product 
variety brings decreased economies of scale. Higher product variety results in lower 
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demand per model, which generates diseconomies of scale, higher overhead and, in 
short, higher average unit production costs. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis H2. An increase in product line breadth is associated with an increase in 
average production costs 
This hypothesis has also been studied in previous empirical literature with 
somewhat contradictory conclusions. By testing it in our data, we can provide additional 
evidence in one or the other direction, and we can quantify the effect of the cost increase 
that can be attributed to variety in the U.S. automotive industry.  
Component commonality and platform strategies have been suggested to reduce 
the diseconomies of scale associated with offering broad product lines (Ulrich and 
Robertson 1998).  Economies of scale can be achieved by producing higher volumes of 
common parts. We hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis H3. Average production costs for a model decrease with the production 
volume of other models based on the same platform 
There is empirical literature that has studied component commonality but has 
mostly focused on understanding the drivers of it (e.g., Fisher et al. 1999) or the effects of 
commonality on aspects other than costs, such as reliability (e.g., Ramdas and Randall 
2008). To our knowledge, empirical work has not studied the effects of product 
platforms on reducing diseconomies of scale and lowering average unit production 
costs. 
The existing literature that has empirically studied the cost consequences of 
product line breadth has largely focused on its impact on production costs. However, as 
noted by Fisher (1997), it is important to differentiate between the physical costs (costs of 
production, transportation and inventory storage) and market mediation costs that arise 
as a consequence of supply-demand mismatches, such as markdowns, excess inventories 
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and shortages. Depending on which type of cost dominates, firms might want to choose 
between physically-efficient and market-responsive supply chains. Randall and Ulrich 
(2001) examine the association between supply chain structures and the type of product 
variety that firms pursue. In an empirical context, it is interesting to understand if one of 
the types of cost dominates and how variety affects the two types of costs. For example, 
if variety affects mainly mismatch costs, firms willing to offer broad product lines 
should adopt market responsive supply chains, whereas if variety affects mainly 
production costs, firms offering broad product lines should adopt physically-efficient 
supply chains. As noted by Ramdas (2003), higher variety can increase demand 
variability and forecast errors, thereby increasing mismatch costs. This is an 
“unpooling” argument, since fragmentation exacerbates the uncertainty faced by the 
firm. We formulate the following general hypothesis:  
Hypothesis H4. An increase in product line breadth is associated with an increase in 
mismatch costs 
Our empirical setting -- the automotive industry -- provides two pieces of 
information that are directly related to mismatch costs: discounts and inventories. 
Automotive manufacturers set list prices before demand is realized, and they use 
discounts to correct supply demand mismatches. Higher product variety will result in 
higher demand uncertainty and in more significant supply-demand mismatches. 
Similarly, higher demand uncertainty will result in higher average inventories. Thus, we 
can formulate the following two hypotheses that we test to validate Hypotheses H4: 
Hypothesis H4a. An increase in product line breadth is associated with an increase in 
average discounts 
Hypothesis H4b. An increase in product line breadth is associated with an increase in 
average inventories 
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Figure 1 summarizes graphically our Hypotheses 1 to 4.  
If we find support for Hypothesis 4 -- that is, if we find evidence that product 
line breadth results in higher mismatch costs arising from demand uncertainty -- a 
related issue is whether breadth can be added to a product line in a manner that 
mitigates the effect of this demand uncertainty. So far, our discussion has considered 
product line breadth as the number of products offered by a firm. We now propose a 
complementary attribute-based measure of product line breadth. Since we are interested 
in understanding how product line breadth interacts with demand uncertainty, we 
measure breadth along a dimension in which we know there is substantial uncertainty 
in our empirical context: gas prices. Gas prices are a big source of demand uncertainty in 
the automotive industry. If gas prices are high, customers prefer fuel-efficient vehicles 
(e.g., compact cars). If gas prices are low, the same customers might prefer other types of 
cars (e.g., sport utility vehicles).  Our complementary measure of product line breadth is 
based on the range of fuel economy offered by an automaker, relative to the range of 
fuel economy offered by the entire industry. Firms that offer a broader product line in 
terms of fuel economy might benefit from internal substitution when gas prices change. 
We formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H5. A broader product line can provide a hedge against changes in demand 
We break down Hypothesis H5 into two complementary hypotheses that give a 
more precise definition of what we mean by “hedging against changes in demand”: 
Hypothesis H5a. When gas prices increase, product lines that cover a broader range of 
fuel economy levels increase market share 
Hypothesis H5b. When gas prices increase, product lines that cover a broader range of 
fuel economy decrease discounts 
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This analysis is related to Busse et al. (2011), which studies the effect of gas prices 
on prices and market shares of new and old vehicles, and to Langer and Miller (2012), 
which studies how gas prices affect automakers’ short-run responses. Our focus is to 
study how product line breadth affects the changes in market shares and discounts for a 
given average level of fuel economy. 
4.4. Data and Variables 
The empirical setting for this project is given by the U.S. automotive industry in 
the period between 2002 and 2009. The U.S. automotive industry is very important on its 
own (it accounts for 5% of the total U.S. GDP, see Ramey and Vine 2006) and it is 
especially appealing for the type of analysis considered in this paper. In particular, its 
pricing structure allows us to create separate measures of average production costs and 
mismatch costs. In the automotive industry, manufacturers set list prices for a model 
year before demand is realized. When they set list prices, they take into account their 
expected production costs, among other considerations. During the year, when demand 
is realized, manufacturers use discounts (incentives, as they are usually referred to in the 
industry) to dealers or final customers for those vehicles that are selling worse than 
expected. Therefore, observed discounts provide an indication of supply-demand 
mismatch. In other words, each of the two pricing levers that the manufacturer has -- list 
prices and discounts -- is associated with a different source of costs. List prices are 
related to production costs (Section 5.2 describes how production costs can be estimated 
from list prices) and discounts are related to mismatch costs. In addition, other aspects 
also make the automotive industry appealing for our analysis. In the automotive 
industry, product platforms, another of our constructs of interest, are used extensively. 
Also, it is an industry with a limited number of automakers who market vehicles that 
are comparable with each other using a reduced set of attributes. Firm entry and exit is 
not very important during our period of study, and models are typically marketed 
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during several years, which allows us to observe the same models in different contexts 
of product line breadth. 
For this analysis, we have obtained the gas prices during the period of interest 
from the Energy Information Administration, and we have combined three types of 
automotive data from different sources: market data, vehicle-level data and production 
data. Our market data comes from TrueCar (www.truecar.com), an online automotive 
information and communications platform that provides information to consumers and 
dealers. Through collaboration with TrueCar, we have obtained access to some of their 
historical proprietary data, including U.S.-wide monthly data on sales, end-of-month 
inventory, and average discounts at the model level. Average discounts are calculated 
by adding all the amounts spent by the manufacturer to incentivize sales of a particular 
model in one month (including the cost of financial incentives such as favorable credit 
terms) and dividing it by the amount of vehicles of that particular model sold in the 
month. We also have access to the same information at the make-month level.  
We obtain vehicle-level data and production data from WARDS Automotive. 
Vehicle-level data contains information about vehicle attributes (including weight, 
horsepower, fuel economy, length, height, wheel base, and manufacturer’s suggested 
retail price) that is available at the model-year level. Vehicle attributes are available at a 
more granular level (e.g., Chevrolet Malibu LS 4dr Sedan vs. Chevrolet Malibu). We 
match every model with the median of the attributes across the different versions in 
which a model is available. Production data indicates the amounts produced for each 
model and month for the models manufactured (at least partially) in the U.S., and it 
includes information about the plant where they are produced and the platform on 
which the model is based. We compute total production for each of the platforms.  
Our main measure of product breadth, PLBit is constructed by counting the 
number of different models (e.g., Chevrolet Malibu) marketed by a make (e.g., 
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Chevrolet) in a given month. This variable changes when models are introduced or 
phased out. We generate an alternative measure of product line breadth, 
MPGBREADTH it, based on the range of fuel economy levels offered by a make, relative 
to the industry. This measure is calculated as the interquartile range of the fuel economy 
offered by the models of make i in month t over the interquartile range of the fuel 
economy offered by the entire industry in month t. These interquartile ranges are based 
on model availability, regardless of sales. For example, for a make who only offers one 
level of fuel economy, the interquartile range would be 0. For a make who has the same 
interquartile fuel economy as the entire industry, this range would be 1. We have 
experimented with alternative measures of the range of fuel economy level offered by a 
make and found no substantial qualitative differences in our results. For reference 
purposes, Table 4.1 shows all the variables used in the analysis, along with a short 
description and some summary statistics. 
Our dataset contains 18,166 model-month observations corresponding to 328 
models. Note that some of our specifications in Section 5 are estimated at the make-
month level, while other specifications are estimated at the model-month or model-year 
levels.  
4.5. Econometric Analysis and Results 
4.5.1 Effect of Product Line Breadth on Market Share 
We start by examining the effect of product line breadth on make market shares. 
We propose the following specification: 
 
                                    (4.1) 
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where i denotes a make (e.g., Chevrolet, Toyota, etc.) and t denotes the month 
and year of the observation. The specification includes make fixed effects that control for 
any omitted make-level time-invariant factors. For example, the fact that Chevrolet is an 
American company is accounted for by the corresponding make fixed effects.  
Table 4.2 shows the effect of product line breadth on make market shares. All 
columns include make fixed effects and time controls. Column 1 provides the baseline 
specification with no additional controls. The estimate of the product line coefficient    
is 0.00106 and it is statistically significant, which gives support to our hypothesis H1. 
One additional product in the product line is associated with an average increase of 0.1% 
in the make market share. Column 2 adds the complementary measure of product line 
breadth based on the range of fuel economy levels covered by the make, which has been 
described above, and its interaction with gas prices. The coefficient    remains 
essentially unaltered after including the additional measure, and the coefficients for the 
fuel-economy-based measure and its interaction with gas prices suggest that automakers 
who offer a broader range of fuel economy levels increase their market shares as gas 
prices increase. This supports our Hypothesis H5a. For representative values of gas 
prices, the net effect of the fuel-economy-based measure is positive, although when gas 
prices are very low a broader range of fuel economy levels can be associated with lower 
market shares. Column 3 includes two additional control variables: the median fuel 
economy of the make and its interaction with gas prices, to make sure that the range 
variable included in Column 2 is not merely capturing differences in the average fuel 
economy offering. Adding these controls does not change the results of Columns 1 and 
2. Firms with higher median fuel economy have a smaller market share on average, but 
their market share increases as gas prices go up, as we could expect.  
Overall, the results shown in Table 4.2 suggest that an increase in the number of 
products carried by a make is associated with an increase in the make market share 
(relating to the role of product lines as a tool for market expansion), and that a product 
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line that covers a broader range of fuel economy levels increases its market share as gas 
prices increase (thus supporting the hedging role of a broader product line that we have 
discussed above). 
We can draw complementary conclusions about the effect of product line 
breadth on market share using a model of consumer demand. We propose a nested 
multinomial logit model of consumer demand (McFadden 1978, Cardell 1997). Each 
vehicle model is defined as a bundle of attributes. We define a nest as a combination of 
vehicle segment and luxury level (e.g., luxury SUVs). Consumers choose first the nest in 
which they want to purchase (or the outside option of not buying any vehicle), and then 
choose the vehicle in the nest that gives them the highest utility. The advantage of this 
model is that it avoids the problem of independence of irrelevant alternatives of 
conventional multinomial logit models, without adding too much computational 
burden. For the model estimation, we follow Berry (1994), which proposes the following 
transformation:  
 
     0 |ln ln lnjt t jt jt jt g jts s x p s         (4.2) 
 
where sjt, s0t and sjt|g are, respectively, the market shares of model j in time t, the 
share of the outside good (no purchase) in time t and the share of model j in its nest g at 
time t; xjt are the product characteristics, and jt is a shock unobserved to the 
econometrician. We estimate this model with annual data. For the price pjt  , we subtract 
from the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) of the vehicle the average 
discount offered by the manufacturer during the year. The product characteristics that 
we consider include vehicle size variables, a proxy for acceleration given by 
horsepower/weight, and the miles per gallon. We also include our product line variables 
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and segment-time controls. We account for price endogeneity using instrumental 
variables along the lines of the variables described in Berry et al. (1995), including the 
characteristics of the other models of the same manufacturer and the characteristics of 
the rest of the vehicles on the market (for more details, see Berry et al. 1995). Note that 
the log of the within group share, ln(sjt|g) is also endogenous, and therefore additional 
instruments, such as the number of vehicles in the nest and the characteristics of other 
models in the nest, are necessary. In summary, we use variation in the market shares, 
choice set (introduction and removal of models), vehicle attributes, and make product 
line breadth to identify the coefficients of the demand model.  
The results, shown in Table 4.A1, suggest that consumers attribute a positive 
utility to models offered by automakers who have a broader product line. A possible 
interpretation of these results is that the benefits of a broader product line in terms of 
market share do not come exclusively from the market share of the new models. With a 
broader product line, customers are more likely to find products that are closer to their 
ideal bundle of characteristics, they derive utility from that, and are more likely to 
choose them.   
4.5.2 Effect of Product Line Breadth on Costs 
According to our model, product line breadth affects the costs faced by a firm 
through two different channels: production costs and mismatch costs. None of those 
types of costs are directly observable to the researchers, but we can estimate them from 
the available data.  
We start by studying the effect of product line breadth on production costs. We 
describe two different analysis strategies to recover cost-related information for the 
available data. The first one is to simply proxy the unobserved production costs by using 
the observed vehicle list prices. This is what Bayus and Putsis (1999) do. We expect list 
prices to be correlated with production costs, because firms are informed about their 
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costs and use their cost information when setting the list prices. On the other hand, list 
prices are determined before actual demand is observed and they typically remain 
constant during the entire vehicle year – in other words, they are not affected by 
mismatch costs. Using list prices as a proxy for unobserved costs has some potential 
problems. Most important, list prices are affected by the market power of the firm. A 
firm can choose a high price point for a vehicle not because production costs are high, 
but because the firm enjoys market power. However, given that the existing empirical 
literature on product variety has used prices to proxy for costs in the past (e.g., Bayus 
and Putsis 1999), we include this model as a baseline for reference purposes. 
We use the following specification: 
 
                                  (4.3) 
 
where i denotes the make (e.g., Chevrolet),  j denotes the model (e.g., Chevrolet 
Malibu) and t denotes the vehicle year. Adding model fixed effects controls for any 
omitted model-level time invariant factor.  
Table 4.3 shows the effect of product line breadth on list prices. All columns 
include model-fixed effects and segment-year controls. Column 1 provides the baseline 
specification with no additional controls. The estimate of the product line coefficient    
is 297.5 and it is statistically significant, which gives support to our hypothesis H2. One 
additional product in the product line of an automaker is associated with an average 
increase of around $300 in the list prices of the models of that automaker, reflecting a 
potential change in production costs. Column 2 adds a set of controls that account for 
vehicle characteristics that can have an impact on production costs (SIZE, HPWT, MPG), 
and Column 3 includes an additional set of controls that account for situations that can 
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have an impact in the firm’s list price setting strategies, such as the number of years 
since the model was introduced and, whether a model is just being launched, is about to 
be phased out, or has experienced changes in its design. In both cases, the product line 
coefficient does not change substantially. Column 4 includes an additional variable with 
the volume produced for the rest of vehicles that are based on the same platform as the 
model under consideration. The estimate for this variable is negative and statistically 
and economically significant. This supports our hypothesis H3. A production of 100,000 
vehicles of other models based on the same platform is associated with an average cost 
reduction of $83.3 on the production costs of a model. Note that the results exclude 
models that are exclusively exported, since we do not have platform data for vehicles 
that do not have any production in the United States. 
As discussed, list prices are likely to be correlated with production costs, but 
they are also affected by market power and other considerations that might generate 
bias in the results. Our second approach to estimating production costs and the effects of 
product line decisions on them is based on an equilibrium pricing model that arises from 
the demand model introduced in Section 5.1. Following Berry (1994), we assume that 
observed list prices are the result of an interior, pure strategy Nash equilibrium in 
prices. For the nested logit demand model, it is possible to characterize the equilibrium 
markup for a given model. It can be shown (see Berry 1994) that, for model j and time t, 
this markup is: 
 
         
   
 
         (   )   
 
(4.4) 
 
That is, the markup of a model depends on the market share, the within nest 
market share, the substitution parameter   and the price elasticity . The market share 
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and the within-nest market share are observed in our data. The other two parameters are 
estimated using the model described in Section 5.1 (0.291 and -5.94e-05, respectively).  
Each model has a different markup that takes into account the market power 
considerations that were ignored in the model that proxies production costs with list 
prices. Using the estimated markup and price for a particular model, we can recover the 
production costs as COSTjt=PRICEjt-MARKUPjt. Instead of using list prices, we use the 
list price minus the average discounts in the cost calculation, since that is the price 
information that enters the demand model used to calculate the markup (our robustness 
checks indicate that our qualitative results do not depend on this).  
Once we have estimated the production costs, we can conduct an analogous 
analysis to the one we have presented using list prices. This is the specification: 
 
                                  (4.5) 
 
where i denotes the make (e.g., Chevrolet),  j denotes the model (e.g., Chevrolet 
Malibu) and t denotes the vehicle year.  
Table 4.4 shows the effect of product line breadth on estimated production costs. 
All columns include model fixed effects and segment-year controls. As in Table 4.3, 
Column 1 is the baseline specification without additional control variables, Column 2 
adds a set of controls that account for vehicle characteristics, Column 3 includes an 
additional set of controls that account for situations that can have an impact on 
production costs, and Column 4 includes the volume produced for the rest of vehicles 
that are based on the same platform. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones 
obtained using list prices as a proxy for costs displayed in Table 3, but the effect of the 
product line breadth variable seems to be lower, in the $150-200 range. Platform volume 
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is also associated with lower costs, but the magnitude is again smaller (reduction of 
$54.70 for a platform producing 100,000 vehicles per year).  
Overall, the results presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide evidence that 
supports our Hypotheses H2 and H3. On one hand, product line breadth is associated to 
an increase in average production costs. On the other hand, component sharing across 
multiple vehicles is associated to a reduction in the production costs that increases with 
the production volume of the other models based on the same platform.  
We now turn our attention to the effect of product line breadth on mismatch 
costs. As with production costs, mismatch costs are not directly observable. But there are 
two elements in our data that indicate the presence of mismatches: discounts and 
inventory. Mismatches in the auto industry are typically a consequence of short-run (i.e., 
within a model year) changes in demand. Although list prices are fixed for the entire 
model year, firms can react to a negative shock in demand (e.g., a slow-selling vehicle) 
by offering discounts (dealer or customer incentives, as they are known in the industry). 
A positive demand shock does not typically have consequences in terms of pricing 
because firms rarely sell cars above list price (i.e., there are no “negative discounts”). 
Changes in inventory can also denote mismatches: inventory builds up when supply is 
higher than demand and depletes when demand is higher than supply.  
In order to examine the effects of product line breadth on discounts, we use the 
following specification:  
 
                                         (4.6) 
 
where i denotes a make, t denotes a month and AVGDISCit is the average 
discount given by make i in month t (i.e., the sum of all the money spent on discounts in 
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month t by make i over the number of vehicles sold by make i in month t).  Table 4.5 
shows the effect of product line breadth on average incentives given by brands, which 
measure one type of mismatch cost. All columns include make fixed effects that account 
for any time-invariant make-level omitted variables. All columns also include time 
controls (year-month interactions) that account for industry-level temporal patterns in 
discount behavior. Column 1 is the baseline specification and does not include any 
additional controls. The estimate of the product line coefficient    is 57.72 and it is 
statistically significant, which gives support to our Hypothesis H4a. One additional 
product in the product line is associated with an average increase $57.72 in the average 
discounts given by the make. Column 2 adds the complementary measure of product 
line breadth -- based on the range of fuel economy levels covered by the make -- and the 
interaction of this measure with gas prices. The coefficient     does not change 
substantially after including the additional measure. The coefficients for the fuel-
economy-based measure and its interaction with gas prices suggest that auto makes that 
offer a broader range of fuel economy levels reduce their average discounts as gas prices 
increase. This supports our hypothesis H5b. For representative values of gas prices, the 
net effect of the fuel-economy-based measure on discounts is negative, although when 
gas prices are very low a broader range of fuel economy levels can be associated with 
higher discounts. Column 3 includes two additional control variables: the median fuel 
economy of the make and the interaction of the median fuel economy of the make with 
gas prices, to make sure that the range variable included in Column 2 is not merely 
capturing differences in the average fuel economy offering. Adding these controls does 
not change the results of Columns 1 and 2. Firms with higher median fuel economy offer 
lower average discounts as gas prices increase, compared to firms with lower median 
fuel economy.  
The previous specification analyzes the effect of make product line breadth at the 
make level. One could argue that by performing the analysis at the make level, there 
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could be confounding factors that might affect discounts and that could potentially be 
correlated with product line breadth. If that was the case, our estimates could be biased. 
In order to understand whether that is a concern, we complement the make-level model 
with a model-level model with the following specification: 
 
                                          (4.7) 
 
where i denotes a model, t denotes a month and AVGDISCMODELit is the 
average discount given by model i in month t (i.e., the sum of all the money spent on 
discounts in month t for model i over the number of model i vehicles sold in month t). In 
the model-level specification, a richer set of controls can be used. For example, we can 
include time-segment controls that account for different discount patterns for vehicles 
that belong to different segments. Table 4.6 shows the effect of product line breadth on 
average incentives at the model level. All columns include model fixed effects that 
account for any time-invariant model-level omitted variables. All columns also include 
controls for segment, time and segment-time interactions. Column 1 is the baseline 
specification and does not include any of the additional controls. The estimate of the 
product line coefficient    is 106.1 and it is statistically significant. One additional 
product in the product line of the make that produces one model is associated with an 
average increase of around $100 in the average discounts given for that model. The sign 
is consistent with the results at the make level, which gives additional evidence 
supporting our Hypothesis H4a. The magnitude is slightly higher than the effect 
estimated at the make level (around $75). Column 2 adds a set of controls that account 
for model attributes that can have an impact on discounts and that could be correlated 
with product line breadth, such as the flexibility with which a model is manufactured, 
the discounts given by the competitors, whether the product is being launched or 
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phased out, the time since the model was introduced, the list price, and whether a model 
has gone through a redesign.  The product line coefficient does not change substantially 
even after introducing these controls.  Column 3 adds the complementary measure of 
product line breadth based on the range of fuel economy levels covered by the make and 
the measure’s interaction with gas prices. Again, the coefficients for the fuel-economy-
based measure and its interaction with gas prices suggest that models marketed by 
makes that offer a broader range of fuel economy levels reduce their average discounts 
as gas prices increase. This is despite the fact that this column is also controlling for the 
fuel economy of the model and its interaction with gas prices (i.e., models with a higher 
fuel economy give lower discounts as gas prices increase). This shows additional 
support for our hypothesis H5b, also at the model level.  
Overall, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 suggest that an increase in the number of products 
carried by an automaker is associated with an increase in mismatch costs. At the same 
time, the tables also show that a product line that covers a broader range of fuel 
economy levels can provide a useful hedge against potential changes in demand arising 
from changes in gas prices.  
In order to examine the effects of product line breadth on inventories, we use the 
following specification:  
 
                                     (4.8) 
 
where i denotes a make, t denotes a month and           is the average 
number of days of supply in month t for the models marketed by make i.  Table 4.7 
shows the effect of product line breadth on average make inventory. All columns 
include make fixed effects that account for any time-invariant make-level omitted 
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variables. All columns also include time controls (year-month interactions) that account 
for industry-level temporal patterns in inventories. Column 1 is the baseline 
specification and does not include any additional controls. The estimate of the product 
line coefficient    is 3.116 and it is statistically significant, which gives support to our 
Hypothesis H4b. One additional product in the product line is associated with an 
increase of three days of supply in the average inventory of the models of the make. 
Column 2 adds the complementary measure of product line breadth based on the range 
of fuel economy levels covered by the make and its interaction with gas prices. The 
coefficient     does not change substantially after including the additional measure. A 
broader range of fuel economy levels is associated with lower inventories, but the 
interaction of this variable with gas prices is not statistically significant. Column 3 
includes two additional control variables: the median fuel economy of the make and the 
measure’s interaction with gas. Makes with higher median fuel economy carry lower 
inventories as gas prices increase, compared to firms with lower median fuel economy.  
In any case, adding them as controls does not change the results of Columns 1 and 2. 
Finally, Column 4 includes the average discount provided by the make as an additional 
control. The coefficient of the product line breadth variable is still around 3 after 
including it. 
Overall, results shown in Table 4.7 suggest that an increase in the number of 
products carried by a make is associated with carrying about three additional days of 
supply in the average inventory of the models of the make. 
4.6. Conclusions 
Our analysis shows evidence from the U.S. automotive industry that supports 
the hypothesis of positive association between product line breadth and market share, 
which is consistent with some results found by other papers using data from different 
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industries (e.g., Kekre and Srinivasan 1990, Bayus and Putsis 1999). Our estimates 
suggest that during the period of analysis (2002-2009) carrying one additional product in 
the line was associated with an increase of 0.1% in the market share of a make. 
We also find evidence of positive association between product line breadth and 
production costs, which we estimate using an equilibrium model of pricing. Previous 
research addressing this issue had reached somewhat contradictory conclusions. Our 
estimates suggest that during the period of analysis (2002-2009) carrying one additional 
product in the line was associated with an average increase of $175 in production costs 
per vehicle.  
Besides contributing new evidence from the automotive industry to the research 
that has studied the effects of product line breadth on market share and production 
costs, we also address some important issues that have been unexplored by previous 
research. In particular, we find that product line breadth also has a substantial impact on 
supply-demand mismatch costs. Mismatch costs arise from the fact that demand is 
uncertain. Carrying a broader product line leads to higher demand fragmentation and 
higher uncertainty in the demand of each of the products in the line, which increases the 
chances of mismatch. Mismatch costs arise in the form of discounts and inventories, 
among others. We find that an additional product in the line is associated with an 
increase of around $100 in average discounts and with carrying three additional days of 
supply in the average model inventories for this make. 
Overall, our results indicate that the costs of product line breadth can be very 
substantial (one additional product in the line is associated to an average increase of 
$175 in production costs, $100 in discounts arising from more frequent supply-demand 
mismatches, and three additional days of supply for the models of the make). Firms 
have developed strategies, such as delayed differentiation and platform-based 
development, that allow them to offer variety with lower costs. Using our data, we 
 128 
 
study how platform families help to control production costs. We find that the 
production costs for a model decrease with the volume of other models that share the 
same platform. In particular, for each 100,000 vehicles produced for other models based 
on the same platform, production costs are reduced by $55.  
Our results also show that product line breath can provide a useful hedge against 
changes in demand. Changes in gas prices provide an exogenous shock to consumer 
preferences and are an important source of demand uncertainty in the automotive 
industry. We propose an attribute-based measure of product line breadth that captures 
the range of fuel economy levels offered by a make and we find that auto makes that 
offer a broader range of fuel economy levels increase their market share and reduce their 
average discounts as gas prices increase. In other words, choosing a product line that 
covers a broader range of fuel economy levels can offer a hedge against changes in 
demand arising from changes in gas prices. 
As with any empirical work, our analysis is not exempt of limitations, some of 
which are opportunities for future research. Product line breadth is obviously an 
endogenous decision. Our models include controls for make and model fixed effects that 
account for time-invariant sources of endogeneity, but our dependent variables can be 
affected by time-variant situations that might be correlated with extensions of product 
line breadth. The fact that our results are consistent for different specifications at the 
make and model level that include a rich and diverse set of controls suggests that this 
might not be a significant problem, but future research could examine the availability of 
exogenous instruments for product line breadth. Changes in regulation (for example, 
environmental regulation such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations) 
might be good candidates, since they can prompt firms to extend their product lines.  
Some other limitations of our work and opportunities for further research are 
dictated by data availability. We have been able to obtain valuable insight from our 
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measures of mismatch costs measured with discounts and inventories, but there are 
additional sources of mismatch costs that could be studied if the appropriate data were 
available. For example, future research could evaluate the effect of product line breadth 
on lost sales and stockouts. Similarly, we have studied product line breadth at the model 
level, but it could be interesting to understand the effects of more granular variety 
measures, such as option content. On the other hand, we do not have reliable direct 
measures of production costs, and we have to estimate them using a demand and 
pricing equilibrium model. Direct measures of production costs could provide 
additional dimensions that cannot be captured from indirect measures. As more data 
becomes available, we think that more research opportunities will open in this space. 
Finally, we think that some of our empirical findings can motivate modeling 
research in related topics. For example, our results suggesting that product line breadth 
can provide a hedge against changes in demand could be further explored using 
analytical models.  
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4.8. Tables 
Table 4.1. Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Mean SD Median Count Description 
PLB 8.21 4.22 7 18166 Product line breadth (number of products)  
GASPRICE 240.78 65.24 231.6 18166 Gas price 
MKTSHR 0.05 0.057 0.02 18166 Make market share 
MPGBREADTH 0.94 0.465 0.89 18134 Range of fuel economy levels offered by make, relative to market 
MEDMPGMAKE 20.68 2.28 20.59 18134 Median fuel economy level offered by make 
PLATVOLUME 35564.25 80271.36 10206.5 9289 Monthly production of vehicles of the same platform 
LAUNCHED 0.08 0.27 0 18166 1 if model just launched 
PHASEDOUT 0.027 0.16 0 18166 1 if model to be phased out 
NEW_DESIGN 0.34 0.48 0 18166 1 if model has changed attributes substantially 
AGE 3.15 2.18 3 18166 Number of years since model introduction 
SIZE 13879.81 1756.78 13757.14 18166 Size of vehicle 
HPWT 0.059 0.01 0.057 17803 Horse power / weight 
MPG 21.05 4.72 20.59 18046 Miles per gallon 
FLEX 0.25 0.43 0 17167 1 if model produced with flexibility (see Moreno and Terwiesch, 2011) 
COMPINCENT~E 2697.63 956.12 2806.09 18162 Average incentive given by competing models (same segment) 
MSRP 32795.28 13500.12 29780 18166 List price 
AVGDISCMODEL 2822.524 2080.08 2499 18166 Average discount for model 
AVGDISCMAKE 2848.116 1464.605 2760 18160 Average discount for make 
MAKE_DS 86.76911 35.6747 84.78492 18166 Average days of supply for models of make 
      N 18166 
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Table 4.2. Effect of Product Line Breadth on Market Shares 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES    
    
PLB 0.00106*** 0.000947*** 0.000996*** 
 (0.000187) (0.000198) (0.000194) 
GASPRICE  9.25e-05 -2.50e-05 
  (0.000522) (0.000517) 
MPGBREADTH  -0.00706*** -0.00741*** 
  (0.00174) (0.00169) 
MPGBREADTH X GAS  2.88e-05*** 3.11e-05*** 
  (7.15e-06) (6.94e-06) 
MEDMPGMAKE   -0.00202*** 
   (0.000214) 
MEDMPGMAKE X GAS   5.65e-06*** 
   (5.71e-07) 
FIXED EFFECTS Make Make Make 
    
TIME CONTROLS Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year 
    
Observations 2,994 2,962 2,962 
R-squared 0.966 0.967 0.967 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3. Effect of Product Line Breadth on List Prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
VARIABLES     
          
PLB 297.5*** 270.8*** 257.5*** 286.5*** 
 
(53.60) (53.40) (53.14) (55.31) 
PLATVOLUME 
   
-0.000833*** 
    
(0.000321) 
LAUNCHED 
  
389.4 290.4 
   
(319.4) (313.8) 
PHASEDOUT 
  
-557.9** -543.2** 
   
(255.9) (251.0) 
NEW_DESIGN 
  
-287.4 -277.4 
   
(189.7) (187.2) 
AGE 
  
131.8** 90.20 
   
(58.97) (62.67) 
SIZE 
 
0.369* 0.385* 0.457** 
  
(0.209) (0.210) (0.215) 
HPWT 
 
41,286*** 41,741** 38,942** 
  
(15,968) (16,317) (15,660) 
MPG 
 
-197.1*** -189.5*** -203.3*** 
  
(71.48) (71.44) (70.93) 
   
FIXED EFFECTS Model Model Model Model 
     
TIME CONTROLS Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
     Observations 997 968 968 968 
R-squared 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.980 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4. Effect of Product Line Breadth on Estimated Production Costs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
VARIABLES     
          
PLB 204.8*** 180.8*** 156.4*** 175.4*** 
 
(52.35) (51.96) (52.43) (54.38) 
PLATVOLUME 
   
-0.000547* 
    
(0.000297) 
LAUNCHED 
  
1,021*** 956.5*** 
   
(307.7) (304.6) 
PHASEDOUT 
  
-887.4*** -877.7*** 
   
(281.8) (282.3) 
NEW_DESIGN 
  
49.00 55.55 
   
(174.0) (172.2) 
AGE 
  
196.1*** 168.8** 
   
(70.27) (73.72) 
SIZE 
 
0.420* 0.339 0.387* 
  
(0.221) (0.212) (0.220) 
HPWT 
 
29,371** 30,073* 28,236* 
  
(14,586) (16,062) (15,707) 
MPG 
 
-133.1* -137.8* -146.8** 
  
(72.59) (72.57) (72.18) 
   
FIXED  EFFECTS Model Model Model Model 
     
TIME CONTROLS Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
Segment x 
Year 
Observations 997 968 968 968 
R-squared 0.976 0.975 0.975 0.976 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5. Effect of Product Line Breadth on Average Make Incentives 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
   
VARIABLES    
        
PLB 57.72*** 74.71*** 74.81*** 
 
(17.54) (17.15) (17.20) 
GASPRICE 
 
4.334 14.55 
  
(68.55) (67.19) 
MPGBREADTH 
 
430.2*** 409.6*** 
  
(139.8) (137.0) 
MPGBREADTH X GAS 
 
-2.973*** -2.748*** 
  
(0.628) (0.612) 
MEDMPGMAKE 
  
53.54** 
   
(25.69) 
MEDMPGMAKE X GAS 
  
-0.493*** 
   
(0.0839) 
FIXED EFFECTS Make Make Make 
    
TIME CONTROLS Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year 
    
Observations 2,988 2,956 2,956 
R-squared 0.735 0.757 0.761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6. Effect of Product Line Breadth on Average Model Incentives 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
PLB 106.1*** 122.6*** 119.8*** 
 
(10.30) (10.63) (10.60) 
FLEX 
 
-337.3*** -344.7*** 
  
(42.87) (42.65) 
COMPINCENTIVE 
 
0.316*** 0.259*** 
  
(0.0298) (0.0302) 
LAUNCHED 
 
-376.0*** -347.0*** 
  
(38.60) (38.12) 
PHASEDOUT 
 
567.0*** 580.9*** 
  
(177.6) (178.3) 
AGE 
 
-21.88* 32.10** 
  
(12.79) (14.27) 
MSRP 
 
0.0972*** 0.0876*** 
  
(0.00685) (0.00677) 
NEW_DESIGN 
 
-451.5*** -459.0*** 
  
(23.34) (22.93) 
GASPRICE 
  
9.787*** 
   
(0.933) 
MPGBREADTH 
  
61.10 
   
(79.28) 
MPGBREADTH X GAS 
  
-1.687*** 
   
(0.338) 
MPG 
  
76.44*** 
   
(11.68) 
MPG X GAS 
  
-0.429*** 
   
(0.0379) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS Model Model Model 
    
OTHER CONTROLS 
Time, Segment, 
Segment x Time 
Time, Segment, 
Segment x Time 
Time, Segment, 
Segment x Time 
    Observations 18,166 17,166 17,052 
R-squared 0.686 0.708 0.714 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7. Effect of Product Line Breadth on Average Make Inventories 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
VARIABLES     
          
PLB 3.116*** 3.080*** 3.079*** 3.165*** 
 
(0.448) (0.454) (0.454) (0.452) 
MAKEINCENTIVESPEND 
   
-0.00133*** 
    
(0.000493) 
GASPRICE 
 
5.596*** 5.677*** 6.479*** 
  
(1.710) (1.720) (1.682) 
MPGBREADTH 
 
-5.063* -5.159* -4.718 
  
(3.012) (3.001) (3.018) 
MPGBREADTH X GAS 
 
0.0118 0.0133 0.0102 
  
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0126) 
MEDMPGMAKE 
  
0.491 0.600 
   
(0.616) (0.613) 
MEDMPGMAKE X GAS 
  
-0.00408** -0.00495** 
   
(0.00196) (0.00196) 
FIXED EFFECTS Make Make Make Make 
     
TIME CONTROLS Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year Month-Year 
 
    
Observations 2,962 2,930 2,930 2,925 
R-squared 0.687 0.697 0.697 0.699 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A1. Demand Estimates 
  (1) 
 
 
VARIABLES  
    
MPRICEVY -5.94e-05*** 
 
(6.69e-06) 
L_MKSHINSEGVY 0.291*** 
 
(0.0920) 
SIZE 0.000234*** 
 
(2.24e-05) 
HPWT 12.34*** 
 
(2.837) 
MPG 0.0263** 
 (0.0105) 
PLB 0.0550*** 
 (0.00812) 
Constant -8.185*** 
 
(0.829) 
  Observations 1,403 
R-squared 0.658 
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4.9. Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Hypotheses about the Effects of Product Line Breadth 
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